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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
GARKANE POWF.R COMPANY, a corporation,

I

Plaintiff,

Case
No. 6186

VR.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF urrAH,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In a case numbered 2262 before the Public Service
Commission of the State of Utah, initiated by the
filing of an application on June 1, 1939, the Gar kane
Power Company, Inc., a corporation, by Ralph B. Blackburn, President, and Warren W. Porter, attorney,
applied for exemption from obtaining a Certificate of
Convenienee a11d N eeessity and in the alternative for a
Certifieate of Convenienee and Necessity authorizing
the cons! ruetion of elect ric transmission lines and distributing system from Mt. Carmel Junction, in Kane
County, Utah, to Escalante, Utah, in Garfield County,
a distance of approximately 110 miles, with an electric

generating plant at Hatch, Utah, in Garfield County.
(Page 20, rl'nmscript aJl(l Proceedings before the Public
Servi(~e Commission.)
(rl'r. 20).
In that applieation it \vas sd out that the applicant
was a coqlOration of the State of Utah; that it was a
membership corporation organized awl operated on the
eooperative plau. 'l'hat the applieant had contracted
with the Rural {1J]eetrifieation Administration of the
Federal Government to borrow the sum of $177,000, for
the use of the applieant, the Garkane Power Company,
for the purposes of building and operating an electric
transmission line and generating plant. It was alleged
in the Petition that the applicant had obtained permission to construet transmission and distribution lines
along and over State highways, and that the County
Commissioners had also given the right to construct
Raid lines over and along County highways.

That fran-

chises for the construction and operation of the Garkane
Power Company and its transmission and distributing
lines had been secured from the townR of Orderville,
Glendale, Alton, Hatch, Tropie, Cannonville, Henrieville,
and Escalante. It was alleged in said application that
they were the towns to be served by said transmission
and distrilmtion line.
period of 20 years to

~J9

'l'be fnmchiseR ranged from a
years, and authorized the appli-

cant to occupy the streets, alleys, and public places in
said towns with poleR, eonduitR, transmission appurtenances for the purpose uf supplying electricity to the
members of 1he Garkane Power Company.
2

The avplieation set out that the contract between the
Gar kane Power Company and ilH~ U nitcd States of
America was known as NumhEr R. K 42, dated September 30, 1!)38; that a first mortgagE note had been
executed by Garkanu Power Compnny awl made vayable
to the United Staie::-; of Arm~riea, and a deed of trust had
been made between the Power Company and the Continental National Bank anrl 'l'nmt Company of Salt Lake
City, Utah, as trustee, dated October 1, 1!)~~8. The money
borrowed from the United States Government was to
be paid hack over a period of 20 years. 'rhat sum,
together \Vith all addHional amount of ~~8,000, for the
purpose of assisting members of the Company to wire
their premises and purchase electrical appliances, had
been allotted.
The application further set forth that the applicant
respectfully representerl that in view of the provisions
of its Articles of Incorporation and its intent, pursuant
thereto, to serve its members only, it was not a public
utility, and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of
the Puhlie Service Commissioll. lt was furtlwr set out
in the Petition that llJL' ajJpiiumt, the Garkane Power
Company, aml tlw Orderville Lighi and PO\ver Company
had entered into an agreenwnt through which all of the
assets were to he transferred to tlw Garkane Power
Company, lne. 'l'lJat tlw inhahita11tro; of the Raid town
of 0rderville had held an elcel ion at which there was
voted that tlw 'l'own Board rlispoHe of the holdings and
assets of the Esealante Li[.;l1l and Power Company.
'l'lwt appiieation \Yas swom lo by Mr. Halph B.
Blaekburn, who verified it as required Ly law. There-

3

after hearings were he1d on l:laid application and the
Commission entered a Hcport nwl Order on August 10,
1939, granting a Certificate of Convenience ancl N ecessity to the Garlcane Po\\'er (jompnny according to its
application. rrhe Commission assumed jurisdiction of
the Company, but gnmtccl the Certificate for which the
Company had asked.
The Garkmw Company then filed an application
for re-l1cariug, which was denied September 6, 1939.
This matter theu came before tho Supn~me Court upon
the filing by the Garbmc Company, lne., a corporation, of a Petition for a ~Writ of Certiorari, which Writ
was directed by the Snprome Court of this State to
the Public SerYice Commif-JsioH of Utah on October 6,
1939, and return thereon made by the Secretary of
the Public Service Commi:;::;iou of Utah, October 18,
1939. This return included aU of the papE)rs, letters,
and proceedings had or eoncerning llw case numbered
2262, before the PnhJ ic Senriee Commission of Utah,
entitled "In the 1\lnit<.;i' of Ute Application of Garkane
Power Company, Inc., etc.''
When tlte matter of the application was under
consideration, the Public
a Brief from the Hurai

Scrvim~

Commission received

]1;!ce~1·ifieatiou

Administration,

WashiiJgtou, D. C., dated .J unc 10, 19:39.
the Commission's 'rnuweripL.)

(Page 27 of

('l'ranseript 69). This

Brief was aeeompaHicd by a letter from Marvin F.
Hartung, Assiscant Uouusoi uf lhe Hural Electrification
Administration.
4

It will he noted that a c~omplde invcRtigntion waR
made hy the Puhlie Sc~rviee CommiRRion of the matter,
before tlH' 0r<1er of the CommiRRion waR mad<~. ;\1 any
witneRRCR wen~ lwanl, aR iR shown hy the two tranRReriptR ntlaehecl to tlw return of the CommiRRi<m. ('l'rauReripi :17:i). 'l'he Staff of llw CommiRsiml ma<1e a
eomplPtc invc~Rtigation of the propoRcd Company's RerVl<'e. 'l'lw l"l'cord is replete with letters between the
Puhlie Serviee CommiRRion aJI(l the Garkmw Powpr
Company or itR attorney.
Undc~r

date of DeePmller 2,

1~li~7,

Warran \V. Podn,

of Panguiteh, Utah, as attorney for the Garfield-Kane
County Hund Powc'r Co-op Assoeiation, indieatPd that
a Petition would bc~ made to the Puhlie Serviee Commission for a Certifieate of Convenimwe all<l NeeesRity.
This Garfiel<l-Kane Hural Power Co-op ARsoeiation was
the tentative name adopted for the aRsociation whi<:h
later became tlw Garkane Power Company, Inc.
A HPsolutioll ('l'ranscript 18) Retting forth the attitude of the Garkane Power Company, lrw., was later
filed with the Commission 011 or about Uw 12th day of
May, A. D., 19:~9. ln that reHolution il1e PrPRideut and
Dire<:torR of thc> Garkane Powc~r Company eontended
that the (~ompany was a Co-operative non-profit eorporation organi;-;ed for tlw purpose~ of generating- eleetric·ity
and the t ranHmiHHion of the Harne. 'l'hc HeHolution further Raid that it waR helic•vc•d by Uw Raid Company tltat
the Publie Serviee CommisRion of Utah had 110 juriHdidion of the Company at all. H waR stated in that
Hesulution that the Company had a memherHhip of

approximately 700, and it was stated by the Board of
Directors that they "resent the action of the Public
Service Commission of Utah, in the particular hereinbefore set forth, as arbitrary, dictatorial, non sequitur,
contrary to the spirit and intent of the statutes defining
the powers and jurisdictions of the Commission, contrary
to public policy, contrary to the policies of the Rural
Electrification Administration, a Governmental agency
created by the present Democratic Administration for
the sole and express purpose that its peoples living in
remote and rural areas and not supplied with central
station service might be supplied with electric energy
made available for their use at the least possible cost
and lowest possible rates." (Transcript 18).
The Commission had before it the Affidavit which
constitutes the Charter and the Articles of Incorporation
of the Gar kane Po'wer Company, Inc. ( 'l'ranscript 35).
It will be noted that among the powers given to the
Company in its charter are:
(1) 'l_1he power to generate, manufacture, purchase,
acqmre, and accumulate electrical energy for its members, and to transmit, distribute, furnish, sell, and dispose of such electrical energy to its members only, and
to construct, erect, purchase, lease as lessee, and in any
manner acquire, own, hold, maintain, operate, sell, dispose of, lease as lessor, exchange and mortgage plants,
buildings, works, machinery, supplies, apparatus, equipment and electrical transmission and distribution lines
or systems m~eossary, convenient, or useful for carrying

6

out and aceomplishing any or all of the purposes of
the corporation.
(2) To acquire, own, hold, use, exercise, and to the
extent permitted by law to sell, pledge, mortgage, hypothecate, and in any manner dispose of franchises,
rights, privilegeH, licenses, rights of \vay, and easementH
necessary, useful, or appropriate to accomplish any or
all of the purposes of the corporation.
( 3) 'l'o pnrchaHe, receive, lease as le8see, or in any
other manner acquire, own, bold, maintain, UHe, convey,
sell, lease as les::wr, exchange, mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of any and all real proiJCrty or personal
property, or any interest therein, necessary, useful, or
appropriate to enable the corporation to accomplish any
or all of its purposes.
( 4) 'l'o borrow money and to make notes and bonds
and other evideiwPs of imleLtedness, and to pledge or
mortgage the property of the Company.
'rhe A rtieles also provide ( 'rrallHcri pt 40) that any
person, firm, corporation or body politic, in addition
to thl~ ineorporator8 of tlw C()rporation, may become a
member in tlw eorporation by: (a) Paying tlw membership fee aH herein specified ; (b) Agreeing to purchase
from the corporation the amount of electrical energy
hereinafter speeified; and (e) Agreeing to be bound by
the Articles of Incorporation awJ the by-laws of the
corporation and auy amendmontR thereof, and sueh rules
and regulations aR may from time to time be adopted by
the Board of Directors of the corporation; provided,

7

however, that no person, firm, corporation, or body
politic, exeept the incorporators of the corporation, shall
become a member in the corporation unless or until he,
she, or it has been accepted for membership by the
affirmative vote by a majority of the Board of Directors
of the corporation; provided further, however, that if
any applicant's application for membership has not
been accepted or has been rejected by the Board of
Direetors prior to the first meeting of the members
following the date of said application, such application
shall be submitted by the Board of Directors to such
meeting of the members and subject to compliance by
the applieant with the conditions set forth in subdivisions (a), (h), and (e). Such application for membership may be accepted by a vote of the members at such
meeting, and the action of the members with respect
thereto shall be final. rPhe Secretary of the corporation
shall give any surh applicant at least ten days prior
notice of the date of the memhers' meeting to which his
application will be submitted and such applicant may be
present and heard at the meeting. No person, firm, corporation, or body politic may own more than one membership in the eorporation.
It is also provided that the membership fee shall be
$5.00, and that the fee after tl1e determination and location and construction of the transmission lines of the
corporation :,.;hall be $10.00. It is also provided that
each member of the eorporation shall purchase not less
than the minimum amount of electrical energy which
shall from time to time be determined by the Board of
Directors of the corporation by Resolution. It is also

8

provided that the Board of Diredon; may by their vote
expel any member of the corporation for certain causes.
There is a rather interesting paragraph in the Articles ('l'nwseript 42), which provides in effeet that the
corporation may sell, mortgage, lease, or otherwise dispose of services of all kinds, including eleetrical energy
and personal property aequirod for resale, and merehandise. 'l'lwre is a provision that other tllld additional
property may he sold, mor·tgaged, or leased upcm a vote~
of the majority of the membership, hut it appears that
no vote is neeeRsary to allow the <•.orporatiou to sell,
mortgage, lease, or otherwise dispose of (h) servires of
all kinds, iueluding eleetriC'al energy, (e) personal property acquired for resale, and (d) merchandise. lt is al:-;o
provi<led that the Board of Direetors may borrow money
from tlw U nite<l States of Am<~ rica and issue bonds,
notes, all(1 mortgages for tlw money so borrowed.
It appears that tho:,;e A rtielos were amended, hut
the amendments do not appear, so far as I have been able
to find, in the l:Gxhihits submitted to the Commission.
'l'he amendments, as found in the Secretary of State's
office, provided that Section 1i3 he amended to read as
follows:

"(13) 'l'he membership fee
whieh shall entitle the member
eonneetion. An additional fee of
paid for each additional service
q nested by the member."

shall be $5.00
to one serviC'e
$3.00 shall he
connection re-

Section 18 was also amended to read:

"(18) (a) Membership in the corporation
and a certificate representing the same shall not

be transferrable, except as hereinafter otherwise
providotl, awl npon tho death, cessation, or existence, expulsion or withdrawal of a member the
memher;-;hip of ;-;uch mern!wr shall thereupon terminate, a11Cl the certificate of membership of such
member shall be smTondorod forthwith to the
corporation. 'l'onnination of membership in any
manner shall operate as a release of all right,
title and interest of tho member in tho property
and assets of the corporation; provided, however,
that such termination of membership shall not
release the member from the debts or liabilities
of such member to the corporation. (b) A membership may he transferred by a member to himself or herself and his or her spouse, as the
case may be, jointly upon tho written request of
such member and compliance by such husband
and wife jointly with the provisions of subdivisions (b) and (c) of sodion 12 of these articles
of incorpmation. Such transfer shall be made
and recorded on the books of the corporation
and such joint membership notecl on tho original
certifieate representing the member~::Jhip so transferred. (e) When a member~::Jhip is held jointly
by a hushaml ~l!ld wife, upon the death of either
such mem1Jersl11p t:Jhall be deemed to be held solely
by the survivor with Uw ;-;arne effed as though
such memlwn;hip had been originally issued solely
to him or her, as Uw ease may be, and the joint
momber;;.;bip ecrtifieate may be surrendered by the
survivor am1 upon the reeonling of l::luch death
on the hooks of the corporation the eertifieate may
be reissued to all(l in the name of the survivor;
provided, hmwover, that the estate of the deceased
shall not bt' rekafwd from any membership debts
or liabilities to the eorporation."
Section

1~)

was also ameuded to reaJ:

"(1!!) 'l'hP corporation may not sell, mortgage, ltmse or otlwrwise dispose of or encumber
any of its property other than: (a) property
which in the judgment of the board of directors
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neither is nor will be ueeessary or useful in operating and maintaining the eorporation's system
and facilities; provided, however, that all sales of
such property shall not in any one ( 1) year exceed ill value ten per ecntum (10%) of the value
of all the property of the corporation; (b) services of all kinds, ineluding electric energy; and
(c) persomd pro1>erty aeq ui red for resale; unless
such sale, mortgage, 1ease, or other disposition
or eneumhraw~e is authorized at a meeting of the
members by the affirmative vote of at least
two-thirds (2/3) of tlw members voting thereon
at such meeting ill pen.;on or by proxy, and the
notice of sueh proposed sal(~, mortgage, lease or
other dis posit ioll or eneumhrance slmll have been
contained in the notiee of 1lw meeting; provided,
however, that not\\'ii.hsLmHliug anything herein
contained, the board of directors without authorization by the memben.;, shall have full power and
authority to burrow money from the United
States of Amcriea, Hc(~onsiruction Finance Corporation, or any ngeiJC'Y or instrumentality thereof, and in eonneetion with such borrowing to
authorize the making awl is:-;uanee of bonds, notes
or other evidences of indel1tedness and, to secure
tlu~ payment thereof, to authorize the execution
and delivery of a mortgage or mortgages, or a
deed or deeds of trust upon, or the pledging or
encumbraneiug of any or all of the property or
assets, rightH, privileges, liemtses, franchises and
permits of the eorporaiioll, whether ac(1uired, and
wherever situated, all upon Hueh terms and conditions as the board of dircctorH shall determine."
It appears that eertain franehises were grauted to
the corporation. ('l'ranseript 43, 46, 47, 4~), 51, 5:), 55, 57).

While thert> is no questiou raiHcd as to procedure,
the record will show that due notice was given to the
Garkane Power Company aud the Company introduced
witnesses, who were sworn and testified. After the hear-
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ing before the Commission, the Commission made its
Report and Order (Transcript 138-142). The findings
of the Commission as to jurisdiction of the Commission
are found in Transcript 140, 141. The Commission
found that "as a matter of actual practice the applicant
will render service to any member of the public located
within the territory served by its system who is willing
to pay the membership fees and the rates for its service.
This is in reality a rendition of service to the general
public, which makes tho organization a public utility as
defined by law.'' The Commission found that the applicant was subject to the jurisuiction of the Public Service Commission of the State of Utah, and granted a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, subject to the laws governing a utility granted such Certificate.
STATUTES
The Garkano Power Corporation was formed for
the main purpose of receiving a loan under the provisions of an Act known as ''An Act to Provide for Rural
Electrification," known as S. B. 3483, Public Number
605, dated May 20, 19:36, which is the Rural Electrification Act of 1936, passed by the Congress of the United
States ( 49 Stat. 1363, 7 U. S. C. A. Section 901-914).
That Act in part provides for the making of loans for
the purpose of rural electrification and the furnishing
of electrical energy to persons in rural areas who are
not receiving eentral station service.
12

Th<• Aet provides:
'"l'hat no loan for the construction, operati()ll
or eulargement of any gmwrating plcmt shall be
made unleHH the eousent of the ~)tate a nthority
having jurisdiction in Ow premiHL'S iH firHt obtai ned.''
'l'he Aet further providL•s that:
'' rl'he admilliRtraJor iR anJ horir.Pd all(} empOWered to bid for and purehase at any forecloRure
or other sale, or ot h!'rwise to aeq ui re, property
pledged or mortgaw•d to Hecnre any loan madl~
pursuant to thiN ad; to pay the purchase priee
and any eosts and exw•nsnH irwurred in eomw<·tion therewith from the sumH authorir.ed in Section H of Uris ad; to aceepi title to any property
so purdrased or aequin•d in the name of tire
United States of America; to operate or leasL~
RlWir property for sueJr rwriod as may lw df~emt~d
JW<'L'Hsary or advisable; to protnet tl1e i1rvestmtmt
therein, hut not to <'X<'l~C'd fiYL~ years aftPr the
a<~quisitimr tlwreof; ami to Rell such property so
purchased awl acquired upon such 1<•rms and for
Hudr cmrsideration aH tire Admi11istrator Hhall
ddermine to hL~ n~asortahh~."
The question hdore this Court n•volvL~H aronll(l
the Htatus of the Garkane Power Company, chartered
as aforesaiLl, and with the purposes lwreinhdore set
out, with relation to tire following RlWl iolls of the HeviHed StatuteH of Utah, l!l:t~:
"Sedion 7G-2-1 (19): 'L'l1e term 'eledric
planl' indudeH all real estate a]](l fixtures and
fH~tw>wtl propL~rty owned, eontrolled, operated or
managed ill eonnediou with or to faeilitate Url)
produetion, generation, transmission, delivery or
fumiHhiug of electrieiiy for light, heat or power,
arrd all eonduits, ducts or other deviees, mat<~rials,
apparatus or property for eontaining, holding, or
1d')

carrymg eouducLors nsc:d or to be used for the
transmission of elecLriciLy for light, heat or
power.''
"Section 7G-2-1 (20): 'l'he term 'electrical
corporation' iHC'lndm; every corporation and person, tlwir lessees, 1rmli cos, and receivers or
trustees nppoinLed by any court whatsoever, owning, coutroliiug, opnrating· or managiHg any electric plant, or iu ;mywise furniHhiug electric power,
for public r,;ervic:c ~within this state, except where
eledricity is gmwraied ou or distributed by the
producer through pri\'ate property aloue, solely
for his own use or Uw twe of his tenants and not
for sale to others."
"Section 7G-2-l (28): 'l'lw term 'public utility' includes (;n:ry common earrier, gas corporation, elodrie (~orporation, teicpltone corporation,
telegTa ph eorpond i rm, wale r corpora tiou, heat
corporation ;md wand10uscman wlwre Uw service
is performed for, or the eommodity delivered to,
the public gcm•raliy. And wiwuovor any common
carrier, g<lS corporntio11, c~cdrieal eorporatiou,
telephone co1·pomi io11, Je!egTaplt eorporatiou,
water corporal ion, Lc<Ji corporation or warehouseman perforrm; a sc•ry] ee for or delivers a eommodity to tlw pnlJ:le for which auy compcm;ation
or paymmtl wlwh3ol~\-er is n:celvcd, snell common
carrier, gas ('Ol'[lOration, eledrieal corporation,
telephone corporation, telegraph eorywration,
water corporation, lt(•c;t corporation and warehousemall is lwre!Jy dec.!nred to he a public utility,
subject to the jur:s,11cticm awl regulation of the
commission awl to ilw provisions of this title.
When any vonwu or eorpond ion performs any
such servic·e for ('l' deiiVL:n; a11y sueh commodity
to any puhli(~ utiiiiy l10n:i11 defined sueh person
or eorporatiou, and (~ad1 ilwreof, is hereby declared to he a pulllie ul· ty, nml to be subject to
the juriHdietiou {Uld regnl:t t ion of the commission
and to tltc provisim1s of tbis title. Any corporation or pen.;o11 11ot cugugcd in business exclu-
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sively as a public utility as hereinbefore defined
shall be governed by the provisions of this title
in respect only to the public utility or public
utilities ow11ed, controlled, operated or managed
by it or by him, and 11ot in resped to any other
business or pursuit.''
"Seetion 76-4-1 : The commission Is hereby
vested with power and jurisdietion to supervise
and regulate every public utility i11 this state,
and to supervise all of the business of every such
public utility in this state and to do all things,
whether herein speeific·ally designated or in addition thereto, w hieh are necessary or convenient
in the exerei:se of sueh power and jurisdiction.''
"Sedion 76-4-24: ( 1) No railroad corporation, street railroad corporation, serial bucket
tramway corpora tiou, gas corporation, electrical
corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, heat corporation, automobile corporation or water corporation shall henceforth establish, or begin com;truetion or operation of a railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway, line
route, piau or system, or of any extension of such
railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway,
line, route, plant or system, without having first
o btaincd from the commission a certificate that
present or future public convenience and necessity
docs or will require such construetion; provided,
that this section shall not be construed to require
any such corporation to secure such certificate
for an extension within any eity or tow11 within
which it shall have heretofore lawfully commenced
operations, or for all extension i11to territory,
either within or without a city or town, contiguous
to its railroad, street railroad, aerial lmcket tramway, line, plant, or system not theretofore served
by a public utility of like eharader, or for an extension, within or to territory already served by
it, necessary in the ordinary course of its business; provided further, that if any publie utility
in eonstructing or extending its line, plant or
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system shall interfere or he about to interfere
with the operatio11 of the line, pbmt or system of
any other puhlie utility already emtstructed, the
eommis:-;ion on <·omplaillt of the public utility
elaiming to he injnriou:-;ly affected, may, after
bearing, makL> sueh ord<~r aml prescribe such terms
and eondit ions for the location of the lines, plants
or systems affected a:-; to it may seem just and
reasoua ble.''
"(2) No public utility of a class specified
in suhseetio11 (1) hereof shall henceforth exercise
any right or privilege under any franchise or
permit hereafter granted, or mtder any franehise
or permit heretofore granted but not heretofore
aduallv exerci:-;ed or the exercise of which has
been s~spended for more than one year, without
first having obtained from the commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity require the exerei:-;e of such right or privilege; provided, that when the commission shall find, after
!waring, that a public utility has heretofore begun
actual constrnctio11 work and is pro:-;eeutiug such
work in good faith, uninterruptedly and with reasonable diligence in proportion to the magnitude
of the undertaking under any franchise or permit
heretofore grantt~d but not heretofore actually
exercised, such publie utility may proceed, under
sudt rules a11d regulations a:-; the commission may
prescribe, to the eompletion of such right or
privilege; awl provided further, that this section shall not he construed to validate any right
or privilege now invalid or hereafter becoming
invalid under any law of this state.
"(3) l<~very amJlieant for sueh a eertificate
shall file in the offiee of the eommis:-;ion sueh
e\ridence as shall he reeei ved by the eommission
to :-;how that snd1 applic·ant has received the
required <·on:-;ent, franc It i se or permit of the
proper eounty, city, munieipal or other public
authority. The eommission :-;hall have power,
after a !tearing, to i:-;sue said certificate as prayed

for or to refuse to issue the snme, or to issue it
for the eoustruetion of a portion only of till' <'OJltemplated railroad, street railroad, aerial buekct
tramway, line, plant or system, or extc~nsion
then~of, or for the partial exercise only of sai<l
right or privilege alJ(l may attaelt to thP exereise
of tlw rig!It.s granted hy said eertificatc such
terms and conditions ar,; in itr,; judgment puhlie
eonvenience and 1wcer,;sity may require.
If a
puhlie utility desires to exerc~ise a right or privilege under a franchir,;e or permit whieh it eontemplater,; securing hut which hm.; not ynt ]wen granted
to it, sueh puhlie utility may apply to the earnmission for an order prelimiuary to the ir,;sne of
the eertifieatl~. 'l'lw <·ommir,;sion may thereupon
make an order declaring that it will tlwreaftcr
upon applicatiou, under sneh ruler,; and regulations as it may prescribe, isr,;ue the deHired eeJ·tifieate upon sueh terms all(l couditiollH ar,; it may
designate after the public utility has ohtained
sueh eontempla ted fnmehisl~ or permit. Upon
presentation to the eommission of evidence satisfactory to it that sueh franchise or permit has
been seem·ed by such puhlie utility, the eommiHHion shall thereupon ir,;sne stwh eprtifieate."
'l'he statutes above referred to are suhstautially the
seetions which were first adopted by the Legislature of
Utah in the 12th regular sesHion of the Leg-islature of the
State of Utah in 1~n 7. 'l'his Aet was knowu ar,; S. B. 4G,
and when e11aeted into law war,; known aH Chapter 47,
Laws of Utah, 1D17. 'l'!tat Aet war,; earried i11to the
Compiled Laws of Utah, EH7, under 'ritle 91 thereof.
'l'he 1917 Aet, as found in the Lawr,; of Utah 1n7, page
137 ( aa), provided :

"rrlw term 'public utility,' when used in this
Act, includPs every common <mrrier, gas corporation, autrnnobile corporation, eledric corporation,
tL•lephone eorporation, telegraph corporation,
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water corporation, heat corporation, and warehousemen, where tlw service is performed for or
the commodity delivered to the public or any
portion thereof. The term 'public or any portion
thereof', as herein used means the public generally, or any limited portion of the public including a person, pri uatc corporation, municipality,
or other political subdivision of the State, to
which the service is performed or to which the
commodity is delivered, ami whenever any common carrier, gas corporation, automobile corporation, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation,
heat corporation or warehouseman, performs a
service or delivers a commodity to the public
or any portion thereof for which any compensation or payment whatsoever is received, such
common carrier, gas corporation, automobile corporation, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation,
heat corporation and warehouseman, is hereby
declared to be a public utility subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of tho commission and the
provisions of this Act. Furthermore, when any
person or corporation performs any such service
or delivers any such commodity to any public
utility herein defined, such person or corporation
and each thereof is hereby declared to be a public
utility and to be subject to the jurisdiction and
regulation of the commission, and to the provisions of this Act.
''Any corporation or person not being engaged in business exclusively as a 'public utility',
as hereinbefore defiued, shall be governed by the
provisions of this Act in respect only of the
'public utility' or 'public utilities' owned, controlled, operated or managed by it or by him, and
not in respect of any other business or pursuit."
Part of the quotation above has been italicized to indicate the words of the 1917 Act which were eliminated
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when Section 76-2-1, (28), Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933 was adopted as the revision of the statutes of the
State of Utah.
It appears that the original Act contemplated bringmg under the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission every electric corporation delivering service to
the public or any portion thereof, and that delivery of
the service to a limited portion of the public, including
a person, private corporation, municipality, or other
political subdivision of the State, would constitute the
electric corporation a public utility.
It is the contention of the Public Service Commission

that in construing the language of Section 76-2-1, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, and especially paragraph 28
thereof, that the Court must give due consideration to
the intent of the Legislature in passing the Act, as evidenced by the language found in Chapter 47, Laws of
Utah~rtiele 2, Section 1 (aa). See Board of Education
of Ogden City Vii. Hunter, 48 Utah 373, 159, Pac. 1019;

Board of Education of Carbon County School District
vs. Bryner, 57 Utah 78, 192 Pac. 627; Neil vs. Utah
Wholesale Gr·ocery Company, 61 Utah 22, 210 Pac. 201;
Pollock vs. Mabey, 226 Pac. 186, 63 Utah 377; Ogden City
vs. Borernan, 57 Pac. 843, 20 Utah 98; Price vs. Tuttle,
70 Utah 156, 258 Pac. 1016; In re Application 7600, 63
Utah 311, 225 Pac. 605; II ayes vs. Boss, 41 Utah 580,
127 Pac. 340; Mar·ioneaux us. Cutler, 32 Utah 475, 91 Pac.
355; Woodcock us. Board of Educat'ion of Salt Lake
County, 55 Utah 458, 187 Pac. 181; 1'7ame:; vs. Board of
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Commissioners of Cache County, 58 Utah
Pac. ~)7.

4~5,
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And the Court is bound to inquire into the purpose
sought to he accomplished by the Act. ( Plutus Mining
Company vs. Orme, 76 Utah 286, 289 Pac. 132).
And the Court should keep in mind the condition
to which the Art was intended to apply. Buckle vs.
Ogden l~'urndure and Carpet Company, 65 Utah 15~,
216 Pae. 684; Utah Association Life, unde1·writers, vs.
Mtn. States Life Insurance Company, 58 Utah 579, 200
Pae. 673; United States Smelting Refining and Mining
Company vs. Utah Power and Light Company, 58 Utah
168, 197 Pac. 902.
As to the effect of the revision of the original language of the Act, I should like to call to the Court's
attention the ease of Pratt us. Swan, 16 Utah 483. rt'hat
ease eoncerned the Revised Statutes of 1898. The question arose concerning the office of the Chief of Police
and as to whether or not it had been abolished by the
Revised Statutes. 'l'hat office was created by au Act
of 18~4, was later repealed but substantially re-enacted.
The Revised Statutes provided that they should take
effect on .January 1, 18!)8, and a section therein provided
that all laws uot excepted were repealed. Seetion 2482
provides that:
"All perso11s who, at the time said repeal
shall take effect, shall hold any office under the
statutes hereby repealed, shall continue to hold
the same under the tenure thereof, except those
offiees which are abolished, and those as to which
:.lO

a diffenmt proviRlOll IR made hy the Revised
StatuteR."
'l'he Court thereupon Rtated the queRtion as follows:
"'l'he vital question, under sedion 2482, therefore, ts,
waR the offiee abolished"?" 'l'he Court said:
''No doubt it iR well eRtahliRhcd, as a general
rule, that an unqualified repeal of a statute creating an offiee abolishes the office and removes
the ineumbent; hut where, as in this ease, the
repealing statute was enaeted, not for the purpoRe of abrogating all the laws, but mere]~, for
the purpose of pffeeting a revision and eodifieation of the lmvs, the repealing statnteR must he
construed in the ligl1t of the eireumsta!lc·es which
surrounded its enaetment, a!l(l effeet must he
given to the intent of the legislature, eve11 though
the rerwal appears to he, in terms, express. In
the general plan of revision, there was no design
to absolutely repeal all the statutes of the Stale.
Nor will a court assume heeanse of tht> repealing
elause that in such plan there was an intention to
abolish offices necessary to the public good or to
remove the iueumbent thereof. 'l'lw evide11t dt)sign in the plan of revision was to eont imw in
force the great body of the statutes, with some
modifications and amendments, aR well as to C'Olltinne in existcm·e tl1e officers necessary in the
execution of the laws, nuder the Revised Statutes.
'l'he. object, doubtless, waR not to abrogate or
ehauge the law to any great exhmt, or to abolish
offices or remove ineumhents, hut to reeoncile
eontradidory enaetments and diserepaneim;, to
remove doubts, aud weed out superfluous matter,
to give the sauetion of positive law to rules whieh
had previom;ly been promulgated and stood alone
on the authority of usage, deduction, and judicial
decision, and to render all enadments of Rtatute
law more eoucise, clear, accurate, a!l(l praetieal."
"The eorrectuess of theRe observations will
heeome more evident when we eousider that,
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simultaneously with the repeal, the great mass of
the laws were re-enacted. Not an instant of time
elapsed between the repeal and re-enactmnt. The
repeal must therefore be regarded as merely a
part of the means of revision, - as but a necessary formality to substitute the Revised Statutes
for the statutes as they were before the revision.
The old statutes, in practical operation and effect,
must be regarded by the courts, in construing the
Revised Statutes and acts of amendment and
repeal, as contiuued and modified, rather than as
abrogated and uew ones enacted, although, in
terms, all were repealed. The intent of the legislature must prevail, even though opposed to the
literal sense of the terms, and control the strict
letter of the repealing statute; and where a particular construction, which appears to be included
within the terms, would lead to absurd consequences the court will, out of respect to the Legislature, adopt some other construction which will
avoid such consequences, if from the whole purview it may fairly be done. The legislature can
never be presumed to have intended an absurd
thing. 'Where a law is plain and unambiguous,
whether it be expressed in a general or limited
terms, the legislature should be intended to mean
what they have plainly expressed, and, consequently, no room is left for construction. But if,
from a view of the whole law, or from other laws
in pari materia, the evident intention is different
from the literal import of the terms employed to
express it in a particular part of the law, that
intention should prevail, for that in fact is the
will of the legislature.''
The Court, basing its decision upon the rules quoted
above held that the office in question was not abolished
but continued in existence under the revision.
In this matter we have not the same situation as
was decided by your Honorable Court in the case of
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State ex rel Porter vs. Ritchie, Judge, 32 Utah 381,
for in that case the Court said, concerning a change
made by the revisers of the statutes of 1898:
'n_rhis change, however, cannot be held to be
one where a section is re-written by revisers for
the sake of brevity or condensation, with the
view of retaining and making the original meaning clearer; but the change was manifestly made
for the purpose of preventing a misconstruction
of the meaning of the statute and to so frame
it that only one meaning is possible in view of
the language used.''
The Court was of the opinion in that case that the
provisions regarding a motion for a new trial in the
old statute before the revision, left the matter in a
somewhat confused state, and it was the intention of
the revisers to eliminate that confusion. In any event,
the language found in the Swan case, S'Upra, has not
been overruled. The Court m the Ritchie ease
merely laid down the rule that taking the old section
with the new and comparing them, resulted in the conclusion that the Legislature intended to change the rule
relating to new trials, for the Court says:
''The change is too radical, according to the
rules applied to ascertain the ordinary meaning
of words, to admit of serious doubt. Where such
is the case, the courts have no right to force
into the new phraseology the old meaning.''
That situation does not exist with regard to the revision
found in (28) of Section 76-2-1, Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933. The rule applicable to this case is found in
59 C. J. p. 894, Section 493, wherein it is said:
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"A mere change of phraseology, or punctuation, or the addition or omission of words
in the revision or clarification of Htatutes, does
not neeesHarily change the operation or effect
thereof, and will be deemed to do so unless
the intent to make such change is clear and
unmistakable. U snally a revision of statutes
simply iterates the former deelaration of legislative will. No presumption arises from changes
of this character that the revisers or the legislature in adopting the revision intended to change
the existing law; but the presumption is to the
contrary, unless au iutent to change it clearly
appears.''
See for the same rule, Pacific Gas and Electric Company
vs. Industrial Accident Commission, 12 Pacific 2nd
649; In re Messler's estate, 1 Atlantic Reporter, 2nd
series, 322, wherein the language of the court in the
case of Leonard vs. Leonia II eights Land Company, 87
Atlautic 645; Annotated cases 1914 C 749, was quoted
as follows:
"Statutes are not to be construed with our
eyes closed to the history that lies back of them.
The aet is ~ r~vision of preexisting legislation
ru~tl ~1 the ~ftii!iN'i;t to change the law in a revision
must be clear.''
See also Stearns 1:s. Omham, 74 Atl. 486; London Guar-

antee and Accident Company vs. Wisconsin Public Service Commission, 279 N.W. 76.
If we construe said section 76-2-1 in vww of the
provisions of Chapter 47, Laws of Utah, 1917, and
Section 4782 (28), Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, it
would appenr reasonable that the Legislature intended
24

to include in that term "public utility," such a corporation as the Garkane Power Company.

THE GARKANE POWER COMPANY IS AN ELEC'rRICAL CORPORATION AND AFFECTED
WITH SUCH PUBLIC IN'rERl1JST 'rHAT
IT IS A PROPFJR SUBJECT OF
REGULATION
In the first place, the Garkane Company is a company owning and operating an "electric plant," as
defined by (19), of Section 76-2-1, Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933. This is clearly shown by the evidence
adduced by the Commission.
As the term "electrical corporation" is defined
by the above statute, subdivision (20), said Company
undoubtedly is organized for the purpose of furnishing
electric power. As "public service" is used within that
statute, it is apparent that the only exception placed
upon the phrase by the Legislature occurs when the
electricity is generated on or distributed by the producers through private property alone, solely for his
own use or the use of his tenants and not for sale to
others. We do not have that situation here. This
electricity is not generated or distributed by a producer through private property alone, solely for his
own use. Under whatever form this corporation operates, it is furnishing electrieal energy to approximately
80% of the residents of the territory to be served by it;
it is to that extent rendering public serviee within this
State.
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It clearly appears from the testimony and from the
exhibits before the Commission that this Company
intends to furnish electrical power to political subdivisions of the State, to-wit: certain cities or towns of
the State. There is nothing to prevent this Company
from selling power to a private power company, to
another public utility or electrical corporation. It is
clear from the testimony in the exhibits before the Commission that the Garkane Company expects compensation
for the electrical energy furnished, and I call the court's
attention to the emphatic language (28) of said Section 76-2-1, with the parts of the statute which we do
not believe pertinent obliterated:
''And whenever any * * * electrical corporation * * * performs a service for or delivers a
commodity to the public, for which any compensation or payment whatsoever is recei1;ed, such
* * * electrical corporation is hereby declared
to be a public utility, subject to the jurisdiction
and regulation of the Commission and to the
provisions of this title.

It will be noted from the section that the Legislature has defined "public utility" as including an electrical corporation, but the statute goes further and says
that whenever any electrical corporation performs a
service for compensation, such electrical corporation is
declared to be a public utility.
When the Legislature designated who or what required a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
(76-4-24, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933), the Legislature said that no electrical corporation should begin
construction or operation of a plant or system without
26

having first obtained from the Commission a c•ertif'iea te
that present and future public convenienee and necessity
requires sueh construction. It is interesting to note that
in said Rection it is provided that the Commission may
prevent such public utility from interft~rring with the
operation of any line, plant, or syRtem of any other
public utility or to preRcrihe such terms and eoll(liticms
for the location of the lines or syRtems affected as to it
may seem just and reafwnahle.
It iR clear that the Legislature had in mind that
the purpose of its Act was not only to protect the consumers of electrical energy of the Company applying
for the certificate, but to protect any other Company in
the field who also had consumers who might he affected
by any new enterprise. ht other words, the public to
be protected was not only that public served by the corporation applying, but the entire public whose service
might be interferred with or the portion of the public
whose service might be interferred with. 'l'his is apparent when one considers the history of the creation
of public utilities and public service comm1sswns.

In hiR work Guiding Principles of Public Service
Regulation, Volume 1, Chapter 1, Henry C. Spurr, stated
it thus:
"Competition was the earliest form of regulation; but this proved to be bad in tlw long run,
for the consumers of utility service, as it too
often meant duplication of facilities in a field not
large or rieh enough to support more than one
company. The usual outcome of this was consolidation, follO\ved by recoupment, hy means of high
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rates, by losses due to competition. Whatever
may be the value of competition as a regulator
of charges in other lines of business, it proved
to be a failure in the public utility industry. It
was a long time before this was understood, and
even now it is not generally appreciated by the
public."
And, as the same author states, in exammmg the
growth of jurisdiction of such Commissions, Chapter
2, page 19:
''Terms, such as: 'railroad,' 'street railroad,'
'baggage company,' 'electrical plant,' 'telephone.
line,' 'telegraph line,' 'steam plant,' 'stock yard,'
and others arc also defined in the statutes of
various states, with the same care, for the purpose of indicating the precise extent and limitation of commission jurisdiction. rro determine
whether a commission has authority over a particular utility, it is, therefore, necessary to examine the statutory definitions. Usually there
is not much chance for any question about it.
All of the well known utilities, steam railroads,
urban and interurban railroad companies, gas
and electric companies, water companies, telegraph companies, easily fall within the definition
of common carriers or public utilities contained
in the commission laws.''
The writer of that work, on pages 20, 21, 22, and 23,
discusses the questions that may arise under the definitions of such statutes, and after discussing the various
holdings of various commissions, makes this comment:

''It has been held that if the question of what
constitutes a public utility is doubtful, it will be
resolved in favor of the public service."
Many methods of operation have been devised to
bring into questio11 the jurisdiction of public service com-
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missiOns. Especially when the service IS such a service
that it can plainly be said to be affected with a public
interest from its very nature, to-wit: the furnishing of
electrical energy, and this has been carried much further
that that in the later decisions (Miami Laundry Company vs. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board, 183
Southern 759, 119 A.L.R. 956).
In the case of Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24
L. Ed. 77, it was held that a calling becomes public when
it is devoted to a public use, when it becomes a public
consequence, and affects the community at large; and in
the case of James vs. Public Service Commission, 177
Atl. 343, the court made this statement :
''There are, however, enlargements and limitation of the general terms of these definitions.
No carrier serves all the public. His customers
are limited by place, requirements, ability to pay
and other facts. 'l'he public does not mean everybody all the time. The status of one as a common
carrier is not changed by an occasional refusal to
perform services for which he is equipped or by
the fact that he does not advertise, and the fact
that one makes written eontracts with his patrons
is not controlling in determining that question.
What constitutes a common carrier is a question
of law, but whether one eharged with being a
common carrier has by his method of operation
brought himself within that definition is a question of faet to be determined from the evidence
in each case as it arises. *** Mere schemes or
devices to avoid the duties and responsibilities
of a common carrier are impotent for the purpose
intended when the true character of such acts is
established.''
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And for a discussion of what services may properly be
brought within the regulations of the Commission, see
Oerman Allian(es Insurance Company vs. Kan._•;;as, 233
u. s. 389.
Since it has boon held that it is not what a company,
by its articles, is authorized to do, alone, that determines its status, but what it actually does that must be
considered in determining its status, it is well to examine some caRes where the courts have inquired into
the status of companies when their operation was m
a field affected with a public interest.
In the case of Commonwealth Telephone Co vs.
Carley, a WisconRin ease found at 213 N.\V. 469, the
court had before it a question as to whether or not the
company could prevent Carley and others from operating
a telephone exchange beeause sueh exchange constituted a violation of the antiduplieation status of Wisconsin. The court said:
"Section 196.01 of the Statutes defines the
term 'public utility,' and under this definition
the distinguishing aml important feature which
stampR a business as a public utility consists of
the furnishing of those things speeifically embraced ill tho (lt>finition, to or for the public.
ln determining whether a corporation is a public
utility, and therefore suhjl~et to tho control of
the Hailroad Commission, its acts, and not the
authority collferred by ih; charter, control. State
rs. Public 8en'ice Oornmission, 275 1\lo. 483, 205
S.W. 36, 18 A.L.R. 7G4; In Chiprwwa Power Co.
us. Railroad Oommission, 188 Wis. 246, 205 N.W.
900, ii was held that the legislative defiuition of
a public utility~ was inteudod to include all corporntiom; that wore functioning as a public utility

:10

under the guiRe of a private utility. No that,
applying the holding of the Chippewa caRe above
referred to, to the instant case, we must arrive at
the concluRion that the defendantR lturein may
he treated as public utilitieR, even though they
were organized aR private corporationR, where in
fact they operatl~d aR public utilitieR, and uotwithRtanding the facts that they had not complied
with the proviRions of the Public Utility Act,
which includeR tlte antiduplieation Rtatute."
'l'he eourt further ::mid:
"rrhe right to regulate and control a puhlie
utility exiRtH because wch utility affectR the
public intereRtR. Under the common law a utility
had no right to a monopoly, and, to ilw extent
that it now posseRReR Rw~h righiR in a limited
degn~e, it traceR Ruch rights to the statute. If
the services rendered by a company are of a
public nature, they come ipso fado mtder the
jurisdiction of the commission for administrativP
purposes. Tf i 11 the operation of their business
they perform services to or for the puhli(~ in tlw
field of public utilities, they are in law and in
fact public utilities, and, at least to the extent that
they serve the pnblie, the eommiRsion haH jurisdiction over them for regulation and eontrol purposes.''
In the case of State vs. Department of Publir: W Mks
(Wash). 291 Pae. :346, the court had before it the queHtion of the status of a water company as a public utility.
'l'he facts in that case were that in the year 1909 Lindsay
and Lenhart
county.

purchased certain land in Snohomish

They plotted it into tracts calling the plat

F'ruitdale-on-the-Sound. For the purpose of improving
the property they acquired a supply of water and established waterworks and system by which water was
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delivered to the owners of the several tracts as needed
for agricultural and (lomestic purposes. 'l'he water
system continued in mutual ownership until l~Jl9 at
whic-h time the owners orga nir.ed a corporation known
as the Fruitdale-on-tlw-Souwl. 'l'he corporation acquired
the title to the water system from the owners of the
property ill lot three issuing part of its capital stock,
and has at all times siiJce, operated improved, and extended Uw water works and services. Some of its
capital stock was sold to other than the laiHl owners
within lot three.

'l'he articles provide: "To furnish

water to people living at Fruitdale-on-the-Sound and
in the vieiuity located ou lot three.'' Shortly thereafter
the corporation commeuced to and continued to operate
water for hire to people outside of the property owned
origiually by Lindsay and Lenhart, the number of such
patrons iucreasing from year to year.

'l'he evidence

shows that shortly after the corporation formed and
continued thereafter, it received from time to time and
complied with an increasing number of applicatious
from parties outside of lot three to he supplied with
water. Such outside parties built their homes so that
they could use this water aud with the expenditure of
$2,000 they had conueeted their several premises with
the water system of the corporation. 'l'he parties outside
of lot three had at all times paid for the water they
received, two different prices to two different classes
as determiued by the corporation. Indeed, all the costs
of improvements, mainteuarwe, and operation of the
waterworks ~were met hy charges collected from the
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outside consumers, while the consumers inside had gotten
and continued to receive water free. The court said:
"Appellants say, as we understand, that because the water company has charged different
rates to those who pay ami at the same time furnished its stockholders whose property is located
within lot 3 with free water, and that those on
the outside who pay have agreed to do so by private contracts, therefore it is not a public service
corporation and that it has never intended to hold
itself out as a public utility. But those things
are not the test by which its status is to be determined. In State ex rel. Dept. of Public Works
v. Higgins, et al, (Wash), 28:1 Pac. 1074, 1075,
the parties against whom the department of public
works proceeded contended that they were not
engaged in a public serYice but private business
only, and hence did not come uncler the public
service act. But this court held otherwise and
in its opinion, upon referring to and quoting
from the case of Cusking vs. White, 101 Wash.
172, 172 Pac, said that such eases must be determined by the character of the business actually
carried on by the carrier, and not by any secret
intention or mental reservation it may entertain
or assert when charged with the duties and obligations which the law imposes.
'"rhe case of Terminal Taxicab Co. vs. Kutz,
241 U. S. 252 is to the same general effect. In
that ease the taxicab company sued to restrain
the publie utilities commissiou from assuming
jurisdiction over the business or the taxicab
company. 'rlw court upon stating that tho articles
of incorporation of the taxicab company with
copius verbiage authorized tho corporation to
build, buy, sell, lot, and operate automobiles,
taxicabs, awl other vohieles, but nut to exercise
any of the pov\·ers of a public service corporation
said: 'It does bus£ne:-;s in the di:-;trict and the important thing is what it does, not what its charter
says.' ''
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It must be hold to be pretty well settled in this
State that no corporation or other person actually
engaged as a public utility can, hy the simple device of
entering into contracts with ih; eustomers and patrons,
prevent the commencement of the exercise of the state's
control or withdraw itself from that control while so
engaged. (See Utah Co1Jper Co. rs. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, 203 Pac. 627).
At this point it is well to inquire as to the actual
purpose of the Garkane Company with respect to
service. of electrical energy in the territory served by it.
It is apparent from the Articles of Incorporation that it
intends to serve everyone in that territory who will become a member of the corporation. That is made evident
by the provision that the original incorporators pay
$3.00, and the later members or stockholders pay $10.00,
the provision bei11g plain tlwt the others are to be
added to the corporation as stocklwlclers as time goes
on and as the facilities permit. It also appears that the
company is borrowing vublic money to build the plant,
and that the more eustomen;, patrons, or rate payers
it contains, the quicker that debt can be paid off, and
the more certain will he the security for the payment of
the loan. There is nothing in the articles which sugguests that the eompmty is going to stop at any given
figure as to the number of patrons to be served. As
a matter of fact, it appears that the company already
has stockholders of about 600 in number. 'rhat is a
considerable segment of the public - it is probably
all of the public who are able, in the territory proposed
to be served by the company, to buy electrical service.
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It is certain that the company, being authorized to
sell electrical equipment, is going to sell equipment

to promote the use of its energy. If a corporation desired to get the service of electrical energy would the
company refuse that service wl!ere such energy could
be had and the payment for it sure. In line with the
cases quoted above it appears thai it chooses to serve the
public, within that territory to he served by the company.
It will not serve everyone in the State of Utah, nor everyone in Garfield or Kane counties, but it will serve all
those who desire to purchase electrical energy and who
can be connected to the line within the territory to be
served by this eompauy. As a matter of fact no common
carrier serves all the public. 'l'he Utah Power & Light
Company does not serve everyone in the State of Utah,
nor everyone within its own territory.

In 18 Arn. J"ur. Sec. 24, p. 425 it is said,
''The conflicting results of the decisions
make it impossible to lay down a general rule as
to whether the remleriug of incidental service to
members of the public hy au individual, or a corporation, whose busines:,; principally is of a different nature constitutes :,;uch person a public
utility. T'his q ue:,;tion depends on such factors as
the extent of the service, whether such person has
held himself or itself out as ready to serve the
public generally --- at least within a certain area
- or in other ways coudueied himself or itself
is a public utility. In :,;everal eases it has been
held that a person supplyiug electricity to others
as ineiueutal to his mai11 lmsines:,; is not :,;o engaged as to Le constituteu a public utility. There
are, however, other decisions iu which the ineidental :,;ervice has been heid to be of such a nature
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that it was subject to public regulation and control." (See also [( ettcnhofen vs. Globe Transfer
and Storage Co. 127 Pac. 295.)
The courts have frequently had before them the
task of determining the status of a corporation with
relation to the jurisdiction of public service commissions.
In deciding the question as to when the corporation
becomes effected with a public interest, the courts have
reached various conclusions. It will be the purpose of
this Brief to point out some leading eases on this subject pertaining to various types of public service.
In the case of Hotel Pfister, Inc. vs. Wisconsin
Telephone Co. 233 N.W. 617, the court was concerned
with a matter of an injunction to restrain the telephone
company from shutting off telephoue connections with
the hotel, as the telephone company threatened to do,
unless the plaintiff should reinstate a five-cent rate
formerly charged for a ten-cent rate recently established by the plaintiff aml charged against rooms of
guests for phone calls made from rooms to persons
outside the hotel. 'fhe trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Supreme Court affirmed it.
The court after deciding other questions had this
to say:
'' 'fhe plaintiff contends that the defendant
has no right to disconnect its system from the
hotel because the hotel is not a public utility, and
the Railroad Commission is therefore without
power to regulate the charge for the service
the hotel renders to its guests over its private
system. J t is quite true, of course, that the hotel
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is not a publi<' utility. But, even so, it may like
any other corporation or private person be the
agent of the <~ompany hy aiding it to perform its
service to the public. The reeital in tho eontract
that the payment:-; hy tlw eompany to Uw hotel
an' 'aH eommi:-;sion' lH'il rs out this idea of the
relations between the parties. 'l'ho commiHsion
only eoneerns i1Helf with the public telephone
servieo performed by the hotel, as distinguished
from the t->erviec to iiH guests performed through
its priYntc system. Then· is no attempt to regulate the dmrge Uw ltohd may make to its guests
for tho iutra-lwtol Hervieo it performs for them.
It may dwrgo and collcd for this Horviee by adding to itt-> room t•hargo to guests for tho intrahotel smTiee it performs for them. It may charge
and colled for this service by adding to its room
ehargo io gueHts or hy making a charge for every
call from one room to another within the hotel."
A careful reading of this ease discloses the position
the Garkmw Company desires to take here. This company would have us say that its responsibility to the
public terminates when the power is delivered to a
consumer, user, or stoeklwlder of tho company. But
what about tho patrons of other power companies who
are already serving part of the public in the State of
Utah"? What of other t•ompanies who might desire to
enter this field"? If ,.;orne private eompany should seeure
a oertifieate of eonvenienee and noeessity from the Public
Service Uommit>sion, am! tlw Garkaue Company eontending it needed 1hem were fu ruishing tho serviee without a eortificate, the gclleral publie would eortainly
be the sufferer beeause eertHin of the puhlie might desire
to patronize the company lwviug the eertificato, and
certain of the public might de::-;in• to patronize tho Garkane Power Comlmny. Duplicitous ::-;ervice would result
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which would be costly to all the rate payers. It might
even result in bankruptcy to one or the other of the
companies. It might result then in a failure of the
service, and after all the continuity of service is the
primary duty of the Public Service Commission. The
Garkane Company could not contend that they were
the only ones entitled to service in that territory as they
had no certificate of convenience and necessity. Any
company might enter the field if it were granted a
certificate. If the Garkane Company contended, as
it does now, that it was a private corporation not serving the public there would be no objection to the granting
of a certificate of convenience and necessity to the other
company. But would there7 Wouldn't we have the
Garkane Power Company then contending that the
granting of such certificate would be ruinous to it as
it would tend to attract customers of the Garkane Power
Company1 A rate war might develop. Both companies
might be wiped out. The farms then would be left with
the equipment and electrical appliances which had been
sold them by the Garkane Power Company, and with no
electrical energy with which to operate them.
No, I think, it is apparent that the prima.ry interest
here is the public. When a company such as the Garkane
Power Company undertakes to serve such a large segment of that public as this company contemplates serving, it becomes so affected with a public interest that it
cannot be said that the state loses all power to regulate
it. The words "for public service" in Section 76-2-1
(20) supra, cannot be read as though it meant "service
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to all of the public." They mm;t he read in view of the
context of the ad and general purposes of the aet.
THE FAcrp rrHAT THE COMPANY IS A MUTUAL
COMPANY SHOULD NOrr BF~ COWfROLLJNG
.Just heca use the Gar kane Company chooses to render its public service to tho:,;e who have subscribed, or
will subscribe, to shares of stock in its corporation,
does not render the S(~rvice :,;upplied any le:,;:,; a public
:,;ervice.
This reasoning

IS

supported hy the eases.

In the case of City of Chicago vs. Alton Railroad
Co., 355 Ill. p. 65:
''The purpose of the Pubic Utilities Act is
to bring under the control of the public, for the
common good, property applied to public use m
which t!1e public has an interest. * * * ''

Palmyra Telephone Co. vs. Modesto Telephone Co.,
:136 Ill. 158 :
''Also to establish and to protect public utilities in their respective fields from destructive
eompeti ti on.''

Chicago Railways
Ill. 51 :

11.'1.

Commerce Commission, 3:36

'' rrhe Act contemplates actual supervision of
every public utility r,;o that adequate, uniform,
and satisfactory service should be remedied to
the public at reasonable rates and without discrimination.''

In the ease of Palmyra 11s. Modrosto Co., supra, the
court determined what constituted a public use so as to
bring a corporation within the jurisdiction of the public
utilities eommtsson:
'"l'o constitute a public use all persons must
have equal right to use the utility all(l it must he
in common and upon the same terms, however
few the number wl10 avail themselves of it. 'l'he
use must eoitel'rll the public as distinguished
from an individual or any particular number of
imli\'iduals, hut tlte use :wd enjoyment of the
utility need not exte11d to the whole public or
political subdivision. Such use may be confined
to a particular district and will be publie.''
In the case of Celina & Mercer County Telephone
Company vs. Union-Center ftfutual Telephone Association, 133 N.E~. G40 (Ohio), 21 A.L.R. 1145, the decision
was based upon a situation where the Mutual Company
eoutemled that it \vould eonfine its business to intercommunication between members, and that while it
proposed to construct and operate a telephone plant,
and to usc tlte public streets of the village under accepted franehises, aud to usc the public highways, that
it was nothing more than a mutual partnership association organized not for profit. The Court said:
"It elaims the right to do so, first, for the
reason that, !Je<·a use of the character of its orgalli!';ation aml its proposed method of engaging
in tlw telephone business, the Public Utility Aet
does not apply to it; * * * "
rrhe statute involved in the ease provilled that the
term "publie utility" sl10uld mean and include every
corporation, company, eopartnen.;hip, person or asso40

ciation, lessee, trustee, or reemvers, defined in the next
preceding section, except such public utilities as operate
their utilities not for profit, and except such public
utilities as are or may hereafter he owned or operated
by any municipality, aml except such utilities as are
defined as railroads. 'l'he Court held that the company
was a public utility, and said:
''As a public utility the defendant comes
under the jurisdiciion of the Public Utilities Act,
unless it i8 taken out nuder one of the three
exceptions mentioned in Art. 614-2a. Two of
these exeeptio11s have llO application whatever
to the defendant, aml may be discarded, as it
is not a railroad or a municipally owned or operated utility. 'l'hc next question, then, is whether
or not it is a public utility operated 'not for
profit.' How may it he determiued whether a
corporation or a8soeiation is one for profit, or
not for profit? Does the filing of articles of
incorporation in which the declaration is made
that it i8 uot for profit, a11d ou which the charter
is issued, goveru or determiue this question'~ Is
the issuance or Holli8sUaJwe of capital stock controlliug, or is it whether a busiucss is to be
engaged in and operated with eousideratiou of the
character of thai business, and the method of couduetiug it, that is the true test"?
"We think the latter. Seetiou 8667 General
Code provides: 'If a corporation be organized for
profit, it must have a capital stock.'
''lt is held iu Suyder u. Findlay Chamber of
Cmn:merce, ;.>:J Ohio St. 1, 41 NJ£. :-33, that the
declaration iu the articles of iucorporation that
it is formed not for profit is uot ineousistent
with a provision for capital stock. lu other
words, it is the dwrader of tht> business and
Llw method of cmHlueting thaL lmsiuess that eou-

trol.
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"A corporation then, organized for profit,
providing no capital stock whatsoever, under certain circumstances, may be in fact conducting a
business for profit. A partnership association,
for the same reason, although having no capital
stock, when engaging in a business, may and
usually is engaging in that business for profit.
''Here is a company calling itself a partnership association, but found to be a telephone
company as that term is used in the Public
Utilities Act, and because it is a telephone company it is, under the same definition, also a common carrier, with all the responsibilities and
burdens which that term involves, engaging in
the business of carrying messages, news, and information, found to be a public utility, having
the right to the use of the public streets by franchise grant, for the purpose, as announced in the
franchise ordinance itself, of supplying the citizens of the village and the public with communication by telephone, and at the same time chartered and claiming to be a company not for profit.
"In our opinion, this claim is no more than
a legal conclusion, and totally at odds with what
the company has done, and what under its own
claims it contemplates doing. It says it does not
contemplate connecting with other services for
long-distance or toll service 'for the present.'
Certainly not. The telephone plant :was not
erected or in operation. What it would do when
the plant was erected and the business of the
company in full operation is very easy to
contemplate. As a telephone company, engaging
in the business of transmitting telephonic messages for the benefit of the public and the citizens
of the vicinity, it would have to furnish facilities
for transmitting those messages to the outside
world for the benefit of that public and those
citizens, because that service is fundamentally
the thing for which it holds an excuse for existence.
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"vVe believe that taking into aecount the
various representations made by this defendant
iu its stat(~mentR ami admissious, and applying
Rtatutory rules of law made applicable to that
Ri1uation ami condition, that this eompany, from
the very nature of its organization and existm]('e,
is a public telephone company, a utility, and a
common carrier, and, ('OliRidering the nature and
character of the business which it must engage in
with the public as its patron, that Rueh a lmsinesR,
uo matter what the pretciJRe may he, no matter
what claimR are advanced, in its very natun~,
eannot he one operated, in the true senRe of the
1erm, 'uot for profit.' "
Our Rtatute does not exempt mutual eompamPs. A
reading of most of the eaRcs cited by plaintiff will diselose that the eases were decided upon statutes very dissimilar to ourR. See Sullwold L'S. Four Lakes Rnral
Telegraph Co., P.U.R. 1918 B 147; ReFire Mite Crep)r
Telephone Co., P.U.R. 1918 B 526; Mountain States

Telephone and Telegraph Company us. Pro,jer:t 1J1uiual
etc., P.U.R.1916 F' :~70; Em.poria vs. Emporia Telephone
Comany, ~)0 Kans. 118, 1:3:3 Pac. 858; Camp Rincon Resort vs. Eshleman, 172 Cal. 561, lfi8 Pac. 186; See note
119 A.L.R. ~)85; McMillan vs. Noyes, 72 At!. 759; See
note 18 A.L.H. 764; Walker vs. Shasta P1ncer Co., 49
Federal 56, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 725; Nash vs. Clark, 27
Utah 158, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 208, 75 Pac. :111.
rrhe ease of Clark vs. Olson, 31 Pac. 2nd 534, D3
A.L.H. 240, with a note at page 248, contains a discussion
by the court of the distinguishing faetors which mark
a dedieation of property to a public use.
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It is the contention of the defendant that the elements which were not found in the Clark case but which
were referred to in 93 A.L.R. at p. 246, are the very
elements which make of the Garkane Company a company which has devoted its property to such public use
that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Commission
under the purview of the statutes of the State of Utah.
In the case of Rockingham County Light and Power
Company vs. Hobbs, 66 L.R.A. 58, 58 Atl. 46, it was said
by the court:

"If the plaintiff is under obligation to supply
electricity or electric energy at reasonable rates,
and without discrimination, to all corporations,
public, quasi public, and private, and to all
persons desiring it, who are located within reasonable distances of the plaintiff's lines, so far as
the extent and capacity of its works will permit,
it appears to have an the characteristics of a
quasi public corporation. Its articles of association do not, in terms, impose this obligation
upon it. They are, however, entirely consistent
with the existence of the obligation. When the
interpretation is considered which the plaintiff
has given to the agreement by its acts in locating
lines of wires in the public highways, and in procuring and attempting to exercise the right of
eminent domain, it is apparent that the plaintiff
intended by its articles of association to take upon
itself the obligations of a quasi public corporation in respect to the sale of electricity and electric energy. The delegation of the power of eminent domain to a corporation is not always
accompanied with an express imposition of the
obligation to serve the public reasonably and
equitably. A corporation, by the acceptance and
exercise of the power, impliedly undertakes such
service respecting the subject for which the power
is exercised.''
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Soc JVinegrove vs. PulJlir: 8 erviN~ Commission, L.R.A.
1918 A 210, note 21 3; 81 S.E. 734.
Tn tho cmw of J>ionPPr Telephone & Telegra]Jh Co.
'I'S. State, et al, 144 Pae. 10()0 (Okla.), it was dt~n~1otJed
that in October, 1905, defendant, Pioneer Telephone &
'l1 eleplwne Co., entered into a eoutraet with complainants,
the State a1Hl Cherokee Hural 'relephone Co., whereby
it was agreed that when complainants constructed their
telephone line to the edge of the town of Cherokee, defendallt would cormeet said line to its exchange at Clwrokee; that the rural Rubserihers of eomplaimmts should
have free nRc of defendant's exchange at Cherokee OY<'l'
all rural telephone linPs for six months, and tlwrnafter
c-omplainants' subscribers should he required to pay
26 eents per month per teleplwne, with a minimum charge
of $1.50 per month for each rural line, and a maximum
charge of $5.00; that said party line suhRerihers Rhould
have free use of defendant's exehauge over the rural
lines; that defendant should give the rural subscribers
or any other rural eompany connected with the exchange
of defendant at Cherokee the uRe of said lines without
charge. Complainants further allege that the farmers,
or party line subscribers are permitted to use, free of
charge, the "clear wires" <·mmeded with the Cherokee
exchange betwee11 the towns of Lambert, Cherokee,
Driftwood, lngerRoll, Byro11, and Amorita, where plaintiff in error has an exchange; that complainants' subscribers, living in the town of Lambert are permitted
to talk with defendant's subscribers living in the town of
Uherokee, without paying the usual fee for said serviee::;,
although complainants maintain a elear wire between

said towns; that complainants' subscribers are stockholders in said rural companies connected with defendant's exchange. Complainants further allege that because
some of their subscribers are residents of said towns
and stockholders in said mutual companies, they should
also be permitted to use the clear wires. of the mutual
companies for long-distance messages, but instead, defendant routes their messages over its own clear wire
between said towns, and charges the usual long distance
fee therefore; whereas the rural or party line subscribers are permitted to use said clear wires of the
mutual companies free of charge between said towns.
Complainants further allege that defendant is discriminating between its subscribers residing in towns and
what are known as ''rural subscribers,'' and a prayer
was made that the order of the Corporation Commission
may issue, compelling defendant to furnish the inhabitants of said towns with free long-distance services over
the rural lines of said mutual companies connecting with
defendant's exchange at Cherokee. The Pioneer Company filed a general denial and challenged the jurisdiction of the commission for the reason that complainants
are mutual companies, not operated for hire, so as to
bring them within the purview of said section of the
Constitution; and the rural or party line subscribers
were permitted to talk to any other rural or party line
subscribers to any other town connected with the exchange of defendant, except where the parties are residents of the towns in which case defendant claims it is
entitled to the usual long-distance fee for services over
its clear wire.
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"It appears from the evidence introduced
before the Commission that the Cherokee Telephone Company, Byron Mutual Telephone Company, Amorita 'l'elephone Company, and the
Citizens' 'l'elephone Company, at Driftwood,
which has an exchange eonneeting the towns of
Carmen, Dacoma, awl Cherokee, are mutual companies; that the lines were built by the farmers
and business men of the towns included therein;
that they own their own exchanges at the towns
of Ingersoll and Driftwood, aml own what is
known as a 'clear wire' from saicl towns to the
city of Cherokee; that as a rule, each person, in
order to he given the services of a telephone, was
requireJ to buy stock in said mutual companies;
and that all persons having the use of telephones
were member8 of the rural companies. It further
appears from the evidence that the Pioneer
Telephone & 'l'elegra ph Company owns the exchange at Cherokee, and also own a long-distance
line, or dear wire, eonuecting all the towns above
mentioneJ; that dcfcmlaut transmits said messages over the community clear wire, when requested by rural subseriben.;, but when a person,
say in Amorita, wishes to talk to a man in Cherokee, he is required to pay the usual long-distance
fee; whereas, Lhe nn-al subscriber, as above
stated, ean talk free between said towns, and the
message is routed over the lines of said mutual
companies.

''It is the contention of defendant that, inasmueh a:,; the reconl shows that the eomplainants
are mutual companies and some of the officers
of tho8e eompauie8 testified they were not operated for l1ire, the CommiBsion had no jurisJiction
over ::.;ueh ('OmpunieB, ami thu8 was without authority to make Uw ordcr8 complained of. In our
opinion, this ('Outcuiion is uot sound. While the
record shows complaiwmt companies are mutual
companies, and 1'1 r. Rather, President of the
Byron Mutual 'l'elephone Company, testified that
his company was not operateJ for hire, yet the
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very nature of the business in which these companies are engaged, as shown from the record
each owning and operating a number of miles of
telephone lines, with a large number of subscribers, who contribute for the purpose of erecting and keeping up the expense in operating said
lines, and the further fact that it is shown from
the record that in their intercourse with defendant
company they receive a certain per cent from
that company for services rendered, shows beyond
question that these companies, while mutual companies, were organized and are operated for hire,
within the purview of Section 5, Article 9, Constitution. To hold otherwise throughout this state
on the plan of mutual companies, and in effect
control the larger part of the telephone business
in the state, and yet could operate unregulated
and without any restraint of any kind. In our
judgment this was not contemplated by the Constitution. The term 'mutual companies' is not
necessarily synonymous with the term 'without
hire'. "
It will be seen from the case cited that a mutual
telephone company where each of the parties own stock
is not withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission, and the reasons given by the court
are that the service to the public necessitates public
regulation. The relation of the subscriber to the company was not the concern of the court but rather the
service to the patron of the company whether he was a
stockholder or not.
In the case of Vale our vs. Village of Morrisville
found in 2 Atl. 2d. 312, the court had before it the statute
which reads as follows:
''A person, association, company or corporation- engaged -in the business of generating in this
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state electric energy and distributing the same
for general sale for heating, lighting or power
purposes or for any other public use, if and when
requested so to do, at all reasmwble times, shall
sell and distribute the same to auy and all persons
'"' '"' " that desire to use the same within this state
for either or any of sueh purposes; subject, however, to sud1 reasonablt> limitations as to the
amount of energy to be furnished a purchaser,
and which shall in 110 ease lw beyond what is
reasonably uecessary, aml also as to the distance
from the generatiug plant or from its lines of
transmission that sueh energy shall he delivered."
Under certain sections jurisdiction in such matters
IS giVen to the Public Service Commission. The court
said:
"Petitionee is a municipal corporation and
operates au elcdric utility within the corporation
limits and distributes and sells electric energy
outside these limits. 'L'lw petitioner owns and resides upou a farm in Stocw uot far from petitionee's high tension line conveying curreut to the
electrical department of the village of Stowe.
Prior to Augm;t 10, 1930, the petitionee was
delivering eurrent to said farm. On that elate the
barn upon said farm was destroyed by a fire,
which was attributed to the uegligenec of the
petitionee in the delivery of such current. See
Valcour u. Village of Morrisville, 104 Vt. 119,
158 A. 8:3. Since the fire, although requested, the
petitionee has refused to supply current to the
petitioner. 'l'his is a proceeding to eompel the
petitionee to supply t-md1 eurrent. When this
case was here before the petition was based upon
the provisious of P. L. 64;j2 and 6453, but in
affording the rl'lief prayed for the public serviee
eommission, after making findings of fact, the
subRtanee of which is given in the support of that
case, based it~ juri~dietion upon other grounds.
That order of the eommission was reversed aud
the cause was remanded.
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''Doubtless prompted hy a suggestion in the
opinion of that ease, to whic·h we will later refer,
the petitiouer asked and obtained leave to file an
amended petition with the commission after the
remaud. 'l'his amemled petition, partly in addition to fads formerly alleged, shows that sinee
the petitionee beeame engaged in the business of
g0nerating eledrieity in 1895, it haH increased
the capacity of its plant from 80 horse power to
upwards of 4,000 horse power, aud now has au
investment of approximately $600,000.00 aud generates approximately 5,2GO,OOO kilowatt hours of
elt>dric energy ammally, ami has uet earnings of
over $:15,000; that it supplies electricity to tlw
municipal electric plants of the villages of Stowe,
ITyde Park, .Johnson and Hardwick for sale to
their inhabitants; that it supplies all of the electric energy use(l by upwards of 140 farmers on
approximately 147 farms outside of the petitionel~
village iu the vieini ty of Cady's Falls, Morristown Corners, the Laport Road, Elmore Road aud
village, Handolph Road, ljJimore Mountain Road,
and in the viciuity of petitionee village, and iueluding ueighhoring farmers located upon both
sides of the petitioner a]}(l all the farmers using
electric e11ergy between the villages of .Morristown and Stowe, all at uniform rates; that it
sells, and heretofore has sold, outside of the petitionee village limits more than fifty per cent of
the eleetrie energy gem~ratcd hy it to the puhlie
generally, and to all persons, companies, assoeiations and corporations, municipal, public aud private that d('sired tl1e same, imliscriminatcly at
regular rates; that it wholly dominates the territory eovcred .so Umt other utilities arc prceluded
from eutcriug- 1herein as c~ompetitors or to serve
the petitioner; that it has trausmissiou lines
and wires extending to sueh huildiug-s; aud that
within 500 yards of the petitioner's buildings,
it heretofore has be(m, alld now is, able to supply
energy to the p<~titioner. rl'he amemlcd petition
further shows that the <h~velopment of petitionee's
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plant has ereated a fmrplus which is not, and has
not been temporary, easual alHl incidental, hut
that it is far beyond what is or will be required
to serve the needs of the petitionee village, and
that although the petitionee ostensibly only sells
its surplus, it has in reality created a surplus far
in excess of the needs of the inhabitants of said
village.
'"rhe amended petition was demurred to, the
demurrer was overruled, and the petitionee was
again ordered to supply electric energy to the
petitioner upon the same terms and conditions
whereby it sells sueh energy to eommmers residing in the vicinity of the petitioner. From this
order the petitionee hm; appealed.
''The questions presented for review are
those raised by the demurrer. rrlw first, third
and seventh grounds of demurrer are:

"1. "rhe matters contained in said petition are res ad.iudicata between the parties
as appears from the records and files in said
cause.'
'' 3. 'Petitioner is estopped by the
record in this proceeding from asserting
that petitionee is under duty to serve the
petitioner as prayed in said petition.'
"7. 'It appears from the record that the
Commission is without jurisdiction, right or
power to grant the relief sought by the petition.''
"As to these grounds it is sufficient to point
out that when this case was here before we mentioned that there were no findings upon certain
matters, and suggested that a case might be prei:Hmted in which we should determine whether the
surplus from a municipal utility may or may not
he devoted to public use without express legislative authority. " " ""
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'' 'I'lw otlwr grounds of dnmurrer go to the
meritR, and im;iRt tlwt Ull(]er the law of the cage
the allegatiom; are immffieient to warraut the
relief prayed for; that considered in connection
with the record in tlliR proeeeding they m;tahlit-:h
that the petitionee is not a public utility at the
place where petitioner t-:el~ks service; and that
the petition doeR not allege sueh matters as in
the~ eireumstmwes of the ease entitle the petitioner
to the relief prayed for.

"It is appropriate to quote from Valcour v.
Villape of Morrist'ille, 104 Vt. 119, 1:31, U2, HiS A.
8i3, SG, as follmvt-:: 'In acquiring and operating
any kind of a public utility, a municipal corporation aetR in itt-: priYate or proprietary, aR distinguiRhed from itR public or governmental, eapaeity, Rim·e the furnishing of water or lights
to its inhabitants is in no sense a goverumental
fmwtion. It holds the property comprisiug such
utility, primarily, for its owu and its inhabitants'
use. If the operation of the utility for the primary
objeet for which it is created produces a surplut-:
of water, light, etc., dietates of common business
prudeuee require that it be disposed of awl its
proceedR devoted to the use of the municipality
or itR inhabitauts. 'J'hat it has the right to dispose
of such surplus within its corporate limits without special legislative authority we entertain 110
doubt; and ~we see 110 logical reason why it may
not likewise dispose of sueh surplus outsiue its
limits since its right to do so in either case is
purely iucidenial lo the primary object for which
it ~was created, and i11 1witl1er is it discharging a
goyernmental function. vVe hold, therefore, that
the defundau1 had the right to dit-:pose of itt->
t->urplus eluetril'ity outsidt> its own limits and to
extend its equipmPnt as might be ueeest->ary for
that purpose.' 'l'lmt l'Hse holds that in sueh operations the defendant was not acting as a public
utility, but that its relations with its customers
were purely eoutraetual, aml that it had no authority as a puhlie utility to operate outside its
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limits. ln the dc•claration ill that ca:-;e the plaintiff :-;oug-ht damage:-; hecau:-;e of the alleg(~d negligmH'(' of tl1e defendant, and the ease came up 011
a demurrer to the replication, so a ea:-;e :-;uc!J a:-;
the in:-;tant one wa:-; not pre:-;(~nted. Wlwtlw1· the
then defendant wa:-; a private ('Ollirador or a
utility at tlw place in que:-;timl eonld make no
differenee in the n•:-;ult, all([ the holding that the
defendant had 110 autl10rity a:-; a publie utility to
operate outside its limitt> was obiter. Tlw iu:-;taut
em;e prm;ents a situation in which we :-;lwuld
examine anew wlwUwr or not this village can
devote its :-;urplu:-; (o public use outside its limits,
and if it ha:-; so devott~d it. Unle:-;s it ea11 and lw;;
it eanuot be compelled to furuish eleetric energy
to the petitioner under See. 64;)2 or ( ~hapte1· 2;)()
(Seetiou G084 et seq.) of the Puhlic Laws, for to
do so would be a vai11 attempt to ('onvert a
private contrad.or into a puhlie utility. 'l'his case
in 108 VL 242, 251, 184- A. 881.
"So fa:-; as here material P. L. G4G2 reads:

'A person, association, company or corporation
engaged iu the business of generating in this
state elcdric energy and distributing the :-;arne for
general sale for lwating, lighting or pownr purposes or for any other pnblie USl~, if awl wlwH
n•cpwsted so to do, at all reasouahlt~ times, HlwJJ
sell and distribute tllt• same to any awl all pt'rsons * * * Uwt desire to usc the same within this
state for either or ally of sueh purposes; subjed,
however, to suc·h reasonable limitatiom.; as to thu
amount of em·rgy to ht~ furnisht~d a ptu·elmser,
and whi(•!J :-;hall in 110 caHe h(~ beyond what iR
reasonably ne(~essary, a]](l aiRo as to the distan(·e
from the generatiug plant or from its lines of
tran:-;missiou that sueh energy shall he deliven'd,'
de. Under Hees. G45(), and Clwpter 250 of ilw
Publi(• Laws jurisdiction in sueh mat tPr:-; is given
to the publie Hervice commission.

"vVe held in Ruthland llail1ray !Jight &
Power Co. v. Olare-ndon Prm'er· Co., 8G Vt. 45, 8:~

A. 332, 44 L.R.A., N.S., 1204, that in the absence
of (~barter limitationH, a (~orporation which eugagt)H in tlte huHineHs of generatiug and distributing eledrie energy for general Hale for power
purposes devotes its property to a public purpose
aH mueh m; if it limited itH business to the sale
of cnrnmt for lighting purpm;es, awl that such
business is affeeied with a public interest, both as
regards the law of regulation and the law of
eminent domain. As stated in the opinion that
holding puiH all corporations engaged in generating electricity for general sale into one and
the same class, without regard to the presence or
a bsenee of special provisions in their charters
regulating the co]l(]uet of their business.
''On page 50, 8:3 A. on page 334 this opinion
comments upon Prof. Wyman's then recent work
on Public Service Corporations and says that
'he makes the whole question of Public usc, or
what iH the same thing, public calling, depend
upon ·whether the calling iuvolves a matter of
public necessity and is monopolistic in character,
in view of the economic, industrial, and commercial condition of the times. Taking monopoly as
the criterion by which a given calling is to be
tested, he determines its character as public or
private, and elastiifies it aceordingly. He divides
monopolies into three clasHes: Nat ural, state
granted, and virtual. And his conclusion is that
when one engageH in a business which is fairly
assignable to either of these classes, his business
becomes affected \Yith a puhlic interest, and the
rights of the pul>li(• therein may he protected by
legislative adimt, and the couduct of the business
regulated aecordingly. 'l'hat a business purely
private iH not su!Jjc~d to sneh regulations is plain
enough. It iH oniy when the public has an interest
in it that it haH any rights to be so protected. Nor
is the situation changed (aeeording to Prof.
\Vyman's theory) if that business, for onQ reason
or anotliQr, heeomQs loeally or temporarily monopolistic, HH where a loeal men~hant for the time
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being controls the whole available supply of a
given eommodity, iH Htill a private (mterpriHe,
and (in the respect now under eonsideratiou) free
from legiHiative regulation or control. On the
other hand, a puhlie calling may become locally,
or temporarily, competitive, as where two railroads come to f-Jerve the Harne territory; hut Huch
do not thereby lose their eharacter as public
service corporations, and they remain subject to
regulation and control.' M tmn, v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 24 L. FJd. 77, is cited as based upon this
theory, and it is sai<l that this theory affordH a
test of public nRe at the same time, logical, workable and satisfactory so far as the matter of
regulation is concerned.

"In Munn v. lllinm:s, supra, fl4 U.S. 12G, it
is said: 'Property docs become elothed with a
public interest when used in a marmer to make
it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one dc,votes
his property to a uHe in which the public has au
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an
interest in that usc, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the commmt good, to the
extcmt of the interest he has thus created. He
may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use;
but, so long as he maintains the use, he must
submit to the control.' This often cited ca::;c
corwcnwd the transaeting of busiw~ss as publie
warehousemen. ln support of the conclusions
there reached the opinion quotes from a number
of authorities, including Allnutt 1'. Inglis, 12 J£ast
527, aml from the extracts therefrom we q note
the following: By Lord FJI!onhorough: ''l'ltere is
no doubt that the general principle is favored,
both in law and in justice, that every man may fix
what priee be pluase::; upon his own property,
or the usc of it; hut if for a particular purpose
the puhlie have a right to rPsort to his premiscH
and make use of them, and he has a monopoly
in them for that purpoRc, if he will take the bellefit of that monopoly, he must, aH an equivalent,

perform tht' duty atJnelwd to it on rem;onable
terms.' And by LeBimw, ,J.: "l'lwn admitting
tllt~~w warehom.;u:,; to he private property, and
1hat tlw eompany might discontinue this application of tlll~m or that they might have made what
tPrms they plea:,;ed in the fir:,;t imdmwe, yet having, aR they now have, tltiH monopoly, the qLwRtion
is, wlwtlwr the warehouse:,; be not private property elothed with a puhlie right, and if so, the
principle of law attat~heR upon them.'
'"l'lw caRe of N euJ y orlc & Chicago a rain &
Stock Hxchange 1·. Chimgo Board of Trade, 127
Ill. 15~1, E) N. K 855, 2 L.R.A. 411, 11 Am. St. Rep.
107, eitc:,; the quotation first above taken from
klunn v. Illinois, supra, in :,;upport of itR eonelm;ions. In tlmt <'aRe it waR lwld that ilw Chicago Board of rrradt~ cannot after having so
eondueted its affairs for a long term of yearR
a:,; to en~ate a :,;laudard market for agrieultnral
product:,;, and in eonet•rt with telegraph companies built up a system for tho instantaneouH
and eontiuumm indication of that market, until
such system has beeome impreRHed with a public
intere:,;t, be allowed to diserimiuate between
persons, and say that one Rhall and aHothcr shall
11ot reeci ve the rna rket n~port s, when all are
equally willing to eonform to rea:,;onablu rule:,; on
ihe Ruhjel't and pay for thP informatiou.
"In ddt>rminillg if a eorporation i:,; a puhlie
utility the important tlting iR what it does, not
what itR eharter Ha \"H. Terrnina! Taxir·ab eo. r.
Kutz, 24-1 11 .f-l. 2:12, ·:w f-l. Ct. 38:1, GO L. I'~d. ~)84,
Ann. Cas. lHlGD, 7fiG.
"Under our Rtat ute:,; and the fon~goi11g authorities it is dear that if a private eorporation
wen~ doing what iR alleged it would he properly
ela:,;sed as doillg a:,.; husillCHH suhjeet to regulation
by the puhlie scrviee eommission. We have a ease
where the petitionee ltm; a virtual monopoly in the
diRtrihution and Rale of electricity in a large
part of Lamoille County, and where, if it has the

power, it haH dedicated its Rurplus to the public
URe. It generateH itH electricity hy water power
al\(1 haR more than a temporary !'mrpluR. J1~veu if
it has overbuilt iR no reason why it should let
itR surplus power go to waste. vV c. are faced with
au uummal situation \Vhcre over the years a
municipality has built up a profitable business in
selling large quantities of electric energy outside
its limits, all(l we can see no reasou wl1y this
large surplus may not he devoted to the public
use until such time, if ever, that the ueeds of 1ht>
inhabitants of tlw municipality require all of the
electric energy generated. To aRRun· an adeqnal(•
market for all of its Rm·plus it may have beeu
good business praetie(~ to supply all who requin~
electric energy in this large territory, both for
the purpoRc of selling a8 mueh energy a8 possible,
and for the purpo8e of preventing competitors
from entering the territory and taking lmRim•8s
which the petitionee was prepared to handle. So
long as it serYeR all(l monopolizes 1l1is territory
it should not he permitted to discriminate between
tl10sc desiring such service. Because it has no
special legislative authority to dispose of its
surplus outRide its corporate 1imi1H e11titleR it
to no special favors. It cannot take the advantages without assuming the liabilities wmally
inrideni to sueh operations.
"As further showing thai the petitionee lms
dedicated iiH surplus to public \IS(~ ouiHide its
corporal ion limits, the amended rwtitiou altegus
that tlw petitionee has fumished to the public
serviee eommissiun iuformatio11 requin:d tllld('l"
P. L. 6088 eonrerniug the eonditio11, opera1 ion,
mmwgemeut, expense of mainteWllll'(~ and o p<· rati(m, eosi of produdion, rates eharged for scrviee
or for produd, eoutraets, obligationR and financial standing of the corporation, at \'arious times
during tlw past ten years or more; that througl1
its manager it has notified tl1e eommission of tlJC
happening of aeeidents within the State upon itR
lines and plant, pursuant to P. L. 6089; that it
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has complied with P. L. 6100 and filed with the
commissiou from time 1o time as required by
its schedules open to puhlie inspection showiug
all rates, ineluding joint rates, for any serviee
performed or auy produet furnished by it within
the State and as part thereof, filed the rules
aud regulations that in auy manner effect the
general public, or rateR eharged or to he charged
for such service or product; that, as provided by
P. L. 6102, it has kept and now keeps on file iu
every station or office where payments are made
by conRumers or users thereof, open to the public,
and in such form or places as to be readily aceeRsible to inspection by the public, copies printed
in plain type of so much of its schedules as the
commission has deemed necessary; that it has,
from time to time, applied to the commission for
permission to construct, maintain and operate
power lines in order to convey electric energy to
variouH plaees outside of its limits, to run its
power lines in the highways and across the highways, to eonnect its power lines with the power
lines of other villages and public utilities, and
that it has particularly applied for and reeeived
permission to construct, maintain, operate and
connect its power lines and equipment outside its
limits on six occasions, the places and dates being
speeifieally enumerated, all between 1918 and
1928; and also that applications and permits to
construct and maintain wires in other places outside its limits were made and issued from time
to time.
"The sed ion of the Public Laws above cited
are a part of Chapter 250, and their provisions
only apply to those subjnet to supervision under
that Chapter. By Sec. i308G, a part of that Chapter, the puhlic service commission is given supervision of all these, including municipalities, engaged in the manufacture, distribution or sale
of electricity directly to the public or to he ultimately used by the public, for lighting, heating or
power, ineluding supervision of their use and

;:,s

occupancy of the public highways. This section
further proviJes that in the case of those whose
prill(•ipal business is other than the mmmfadure,
distribution or sale of eleetricity direetly to the
public, or ultimately to he used by the public, for
lighting, heating, or power, they shall he under
the supervision of the commission only as to that
part of their business which has to do with sueh
manufacture, distribution or sale of electricity.
So far as the manufaetnre, dist ribntio11 or sale
of electricity for use within the petiticmee's eorporate limits are coneerned, this seeticm given the
commission supervision, hut if, as it contends,
it is doing a private business outside, it is not subject to supervision as to that part of its husiuess.
Yet, the foregoing allegations are sufficiently
broad to show that it has treated this part of its
business as also suhjeet to supervision, allll to
tend to show it has dedieated that business to
the pnhlic use. Palenno Land & Wat~er Co. '17.
Railroad Comm., 11:1 Cal. ;)80, lGO P. 228."
In this brief it is necessary that the argument 011
the ph raRe "affected with a publie interest," or, as
stated by the statutes of the State of Utah, "for public
st~rvice within this State," or, as stated in another Rubsection, "where the serviee is performed for the publie
generally,'' be developed by a reference to cases whieh,
while not altogether in point, are statements of eourts
as to the delimitationR of a private business and a lmsiness which is so affected with a public interest that it
becomes a public utility. 'l'he statute must be read m
the light of these cases and it has been the purpoRe of
tlw

writer

of

this

brief

to

g1ve

the

Court

the

benefit of the reasoning of courts and commissionR
regarding the definition of similar phrases -

or the

reasoning of courts as to the public service required
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before a company becomes a public utility and therefore
under the jurisdiction of a regulatory commission.
Standing by itself, the phrase, "where the service
IS performed for the public generally," or the phrase,
"furnishing electric power for public service within
this State," cannot mean very much unless the whole
context is viewed in the light of decisions of courts.
After all, when is a service performed to the public
generally? When is electrical power furnished for public
service within this State 7 One of the ways to arrive
at the answer to these questions is by taking the reasoning of cases which have been decided by judges who were
faced with the question of determining wheu a business
became so affected with the public interest that it
ceased to be a private business and was subject to
regulation. Therefore, at the risk of making this unduly prolix I am going to continue to cite eases which
bear upon this subject.
A case which bears upon the reasoning of a business
so affected with a public interest that it ceases to be
private and becomes subject to the jurisdiction of a
regulatory commission, is the case of United States v.
Ohio Oil, found at 234 U.S. 546, 58 L. Eel. 1459. Mr.
Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court and
stated the facts to be that the Interstate Commerce Commission had issued an order requiring the Ohio Oil
Company to file with the Commission schedules of rates
and charges and the company brought suit to set aside
and annul the order, and he further said:
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''The circumstances in which the amendment
was passed are known to everyone. The Standard
Oil Company, a New Jersey corporation, owned
the stock of the New York Transit Company, a
pipe line made a common carrier by the laws of
New York, and of the National Transit Company,
a Pennsylvania corporation of like character,
and by these it connected the Appalachian oil
field with its refineries in the east. It owned
nearly all the stock of the Ohio Oil Company,
which connected the Lima-Indiana field with its
system; and the National Transit Company, controlled by it, owned nearly all the stock of the
Prairie Oil & Gas Company, which ran from the
mid-continent field in Oklahoma and Kansas and
the Caddo field in Louisiana to Indiana, and connected with the previously mentioned lines. It
also was largely interested in the Tide Water
Pipe Company, Limited, which connected with
the Appalachian and other fields and pursued the
methods of the Standard Oil Company about to
be described. By the before-mentioned and subordinate lines the Standard Oil Company has
made itself master of the only practicable oil
transportation between the oil fields east of
California and the Atlantic ocean, and carried
much the greater part of the oil between those
points. Before the recent dissolution, the New
York and Pennsylvania companies had extended
their lines into New Jersey and Maryland to
the refineries, and the laws of those states did
not require them to be common carriers. To
meet the present amendment the Standard Oil
Company took a conveyance of the New Jersey
and Maryland lines, and the common carrier
lines now end at insignificant places where there
are neither market nor appliances except those of
the Standard Oil, by which it would seem that
the whole transport of the carriers' lines is
received. There is what seems to be merely a
formal breach of continuity when the carriers'
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pipes stop. The chaugc is not material to our view
of the case.
"Availing itself of its monopoly of the means
of transportation the Standard Oil Company refused through its subordinates, to carry any oil
unless the same was sold to it or to them, awl
through them to it, on ierms more or less dictated by itself. ln this way it made itself master
of the fields without the necessity of <nvuing them,
and carried aeross half the continent a great
subject of international rommerce coming from
many o\vners, but, by ihc duress of which the
Standanl Oil Company was master, carrying it all
as its own. 'l'he main question is whether the
act docs and constitutionally can apply to the
several constituents that then had been united
into a single line.
'' 'l'aking up first the construction of the
statute, we think it plain that it was intended
to reach the combination of pipe lines that we
have described. 'l'he provisions of the act are
to apply to any person engaged in the transportation of oil hy means of pipe lines. 'l'he
words 'who shall be considered and held to be
common carriers within Uw meaning and purpose of this act' o1JViously are uot intended to
cut dowu the generality of the previous declaration to the meaning that only those shall be held
commou carriers within the act who were common
carriers in a techuical sense, but an injunction
that those iu control of pipe lines and engaged
in the transportation of oil shall be dealt with
as such. If the Stawlard Oil Company and its
cooperating companies were not so engaged no
one was. lt not only \Vould be a ~mcrificc of fact
to form, but would empty the act if the carriage
to the seaboard of nearly all the oil cast of
California were held not to be transportation
within its meaning, because of the exercise of
their power the carriers imposed as a condition
to ihe carriage a sale to themselves.''
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As a matter of fact, courts have always been
troubled since the Munn decision, with the line of demarcation between a private and public business, and yet
out of the decisions have come certain rules which are
guideposts and to which we can now turn with some
degree of assurance.
As an example of that, I cite the case of Davis v.
Public Utilities Commission, a Colorado case found at
247 Pac. 801. There was an action to prohibit the defendant Davis from operating as a common carrier
without procurring from the Public Utilities Commission
a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The
facts were that Davis was engaged in the transportation
of freight of all kinds between Grand Junction and
Paonia, and intervening points. His purported employer
was the Delta County Merchants' and Manufacturing
Association. Its 121 members were the shippers of
more than 90% of the freight carried in that territory.
This freighting was carried on by means of automobile
trucks; the number depending upon the volume of business. These and all other equipment were owned by
defendant. He had formerly freighted for many of his
present patrons, and had applied to the commission for
a certificate, which was refused. He solicited the memberships and organized the association. He and his
associates represented that the organization was necessary to enable him to continue business. It held
no meetings save the one for organization. Its president had presided 15 minutes, had never appointed any
committees, and did not know who were the members
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thereof, or who was the vice presidPnt. The membership
fee was $1.00, which few paid. Defewlant had a eontraet
\Vith the association, binding him to haul for those only
who belouged to it, bnt accepted shipments from nonmembers, and viee versa, on the order and payment of
either. He maintained a storage and transfer station
at Delta, insured the goods transported, charged regular freight rates, based on weight and mileage (charges
being paid by individual shippers, uot the association),
accepted freight C.O.D., and carried indemnity msurance to proteet his patrons. 'l'he eourt said:
"Contrary to popular opiniou, mere sehemes
to evade law, ouce their true character is establislwd, arc importaut for the purpose intended.
Courts sweep them aside as so much rubbish.
''In detcrming whether a business is that of a
common carrier, -'the important thing is what
it does, not what its (•harter says.' Terminal
Ta:x:icab Co. u. Kutz, et al, 241 U.S. 232, GO L.
Ed. 984, etc. A service may effect 'so considerable
a fraetion of the public that it is public in the
same sense in which any other may be called
so * * * 'l'he public does not mean everybody all
the time.' ld.
"Had defell<lnut made all save one of the
shippers of freight i11 that territory, or all purchasers of postage at any post office therein,
members of the m;so(•iatiou, aud claimed that such
limitation eouverted an otherwise public into a
private eaninr, tlw <'ontention would be so absurd
as to be iustantly rejected. But the reasons for
that rejeetiou would he the identieal reasons which
demand rejection of defelHlant 's contention, in the
instant ease: (a) 'l'he proportion of the public
served is so large as to he the public; (b) the limita iion is a mm·p d0vice to hoodwink the Jaw.''

G4

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in the case of
Southern Oklahoma Power Company v. the Corporation
Commission, 220 Pac. 370, had to determine whether a
plant engaged in the manufacture of electrical energy
which it furnished under contract at the switchboard
at its plant to a public utility which is engaged in the
business of transmitting and distributing current to
the various cities in the State is a public utility and as
such is subject to the control of the Corporation Commission of this state. The company is a corporation
under the laws of the State of Oklahoma. It owns and
operates an electrical plant located at Byng and is engaged in generating electric current, the entire output
of the plant being sold at the switchboard of the Southern Oklahoma Power Company to the Oklahoma Light
& Power Company, under the terms of a twenty-year
contract. The Oklahoma Light & Power Company is
engaged in the business of transmitting and distributing
electrical energy to various towns and cities served by
it. The statutes of Oklahoma provided that:
'' rrhe term 'public utility,' as used in this act
shall be taken to mean and include every corporation, association, etc., except towns, etc., that
now or hereafter may own, operate, or manage
any plant or equipment or any part thereof
directly or indirectly for public use, or may supply any commodity to be furnished to the public
" " * for the production, transmission, etc., furnishing electrical current for light, heat or power."
The court said, in deciding this case:
'' rrhe plaintiff in error contends that the
Southern Oklahoma Power Company does not
hold itself out to the public as furnishing power
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or electricity; that it simply furnishes electricity
to one public utility uuder private contract;
that this is simply a case of a private corporation
furuishing a public utility with a commodity
which the latter iu turu distributes for public
use; and that tlw element is lackiug which would
determiue that that is a public utility, viz. the
impresRion of its service with a public use.

"lt is our opiniou that the statutory definition of a public utility is sufficiently broad to
inelude a plaut operated as the plant of the
plaintiff in error, where it generates electricity
aud furnishes same under a contract to a public
utility for distribution to the public. 'rhi:,; corporation operates a plant which furnishes and
supplies a commodity ( t~lectrie energy) to be
furllished to the public for the production of
eledric current for light, heat, ami power. 'l'lw
Rtatute doeR not require that the corporation
furnish the commodity to the public, but, if it
furuishes a commodity for the purpose of that
commodity being delivered to the public for the
production of light, heat, or power, it comes
within the statutory definition. It is our opinion
that the statute impresses the service rendered
by this corporation with a public uRe.
''Plaintiff in error contends further that
the corporation is Itot a puhlie utility beeauRe
it does not profes:,; to serve the public, am] hecause its charter provisions do not permit the
excreise of the fmwtions of a public utility. In
this ccnmedion it is contended by tlw plaintiff
in error that in Oklahoma Natwral Gas Co. c.
CorrJOration Commission, 211 Pac. 401, this court
held that a corporation slwuld not he required
to relJ(ler a service outside awl beyond it:,; profes:,;ion of servict~, ~md uuder tl1is amwuneement
the plaintiff in error shoulJ not he held to be a
public utility, because it does not profess to he
such. rrhc rule announcement in the above ease
has no application to the case at bar, as that
(j()

case applied to an order requiring the Oklahoma
Natural Gas Company to give service which it
had not been giving, and which it did not profess
to give; whereas, in the instant case, we have
an attempt to regulate a service which is already
being rendered. In the instant case the corporation commission says :
'' 'The service in which you are engaged,
and in which you profess to be, constitutes
you a public utility, and subject to the statutory regulations as such.'
''No effort is made to require the corporation to do something which it has not professed;
but only to regulate the corporation in connection with the service which it professes and actually renders. rrhe plaintiff contends that the
corporation commission is attempting to extend
its regulatory jurisdiction over a company which
has never made any dedication of its property to
a public use, or made any profession of service
to the public. Such is not the case. The statute
has prescribed that the very service performed
by this corporation is a public service, and, when
the corporation undertakes to and does perform
that service which the statute has defined to be
a public service, such action constitutes a dedication of property to the public use.

''It is next contended that the charter of
the company provides that it is incorporated for
the purpose of building, owning, and operating a
plant in Pontotoc county to be used for the purpose of manufacturing and selling at the switchboard of the corporation at its power plant electric energy, and that it can only exercise the
rights and powers conferred by its charter, and,
since its charter does not authorize it to assume
to serve the public generally, service to the public
would be ultra vires. It is sufficient to say that
the charter provision is adequate to authorize
the corporation to do just what it is doing, to-wit:
supply and sell to the Oklahoma Light & Power
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Company eleetrie energy at the switchboard of
the corporation to be distributed by tlte Oklahoma
Light & Power Company to the public, and that
such ads whi('h are authorized to he performed
by it uudC'r its charter an~ t-meh ads as eoustitute
the corporation a puhlie utility umler the statute * * "
"And in the instant (~ase we are of the
opinion that the Legislature intended, and iu plain
terms provided, for tliC control of the corporation eommi:,;siou of all plaut::; prodtwing electricity
to be fumi::·dwd to the puhlie for the production
of light, heat, or power.

"ln State ex rel. Public Sen:ice C(nnmission
of Washington r. 8puka11e, 8!J ·wash. G!J9, 1G4 Pae.
1110, L.RA. 1918 C, (i/;), the court said:
" "l'he regulation awl control of business of a pri\·ate uature is ::mstaiucd by reference to the police power, and even then
it. is sustained o1lly when the courts have
been (fully) ahle to say thai a hu::;iness is,
in ehara('ter awl ext cut of operation, such
that it tolH·he::; ll1e whole people and affect::;
tl1eir general ·welfare. It i::; upon thi::; principle that Noble Stale Hauk r. /Iaskell, 219
U.B. 104, "' '' ·• awl German Alliaucr: Ins. Co.
u. Kansas, 2:-l:3 U. S. :J8D, ... rest. Uutll the
Legislature bring-:,; a business within the
poliec power hy dear intent euurts will not
do so. Courts lmve assumed to say whether
an ad of ihc Lc·gislaturc falls within the
police po'.ver, bui primarily the a:::;::wrtiun of
police power is for the Legislature.' ''
-*In the in::;taut ease, it i:-; our opinion that the
Legislature has as::;erted its police power, and
the busiue::;s of ilw plaintiff in error is dearly
within the terms of the statute.•
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In Claypool 11. l)igldt1.ing Delil'ery Company, 299
Pac. 126, in dcterming when a person became a common
earner the eourt Raid:

"* * * Nor eau a carrier which holdR itself
out to the public as being a eommou ('arrier diYeRl
itRclf of that charader hceanRe it haR a Reeret
or private intention to reRcrve the right to refuRe
to Rerve Rueh partieR aR it objectR to, or because
it may, even upon oceaRion, cxcrei~;e such riglli,
particularly if sueh reRervation and exercise
thereof is in n~ality, though not ostensibly, merely
for the purpm;e of diveRting itself of the character and responsibility of a eommou eanicr.''
In .July of 1918 in l\1 iRsouri the l\1 issouri eourt
was concerned with a brewery corporation where the
corporation installed machinery to generate eleetrieal
current, and its president, finding that there was surplus
current, organized a company to sell current to individuals in the vieinity, requiri11g them to conRtruct ami pay
for li11es supplying eurrent, but with no fnmehise from
the city. The court was faced with the problem of determining whether the new company formed by the
manager was a publie utility, and the court discussed
the rules relating to public eorporations (Danciger & Co.
v. Public Service Cmnmission of illlissouri et al, 205 S.\V.
36). 'J'he <lefinition of au eleetric plant in the Missouri
statutes wa:,; as follows:

•·

'"rhe term 'eleetrie plant,' when used in thiH
ad, indudPs all real estate, fixtures ami personal
property operated, coutrolled, owned, used or to
he used for or in emmeetion with or to faeilitate
tlJe generation, transmi:,;:,;ion, distribution, sale or
furnishing. of eleetrieity for light, heat or power;

* * *

'' 'rhe term 'elertri<'al corpora tiou,' wl~en mwd
in this act, includes every eorporation, company,
* * * owning, operating, eontro11ing or managing
a11y electric plant except wlwre eledricity iR genm·ate<l or distributed hy the producer Rolely on
or through private property for railroad purpoRes
or for itA O\Yll m;e or the use of its tenants and
11ot for Rale to others."
'rhe court in deriding that ease held that the company was not subject to the Public Service Commission,
but seems to have given great weight to the fact that
there was 110 explicit profession of public service by
the corporation io furnish lights or power to the whole
public, or even to all persons in that restricted portion
thereof who reside within three blocks of the Compa11y 'R
plant; for there is in the case neither existence nor
assertion of the right of eminent domain. Nor docs there
exist any franchise or license, nor has there been obtained any right or privilege to cross the streets, alleys,
or other public places therein, nor are there any charter powers authorizing the Company, or respondent,
to engag'e in the publie service. How different is that
case from the one before this eourt. The elements which
the Court in the Danciger caRe said did not exist arc
present to a large extent in the ease before this Court.
In the case of Va'n Dyke v. Geary, 61 L . .BJd. 973,
244 U. S. 39, the Supreme Court of the United States
stated that a water system operated for ihe purpose of
supplying water to the residents and inhabitants of a
part of a townsite is a public utility so as to he subject
to rate regulation hy the State Public Service Commission, although the plant is owned by an individual who
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pumps the water on her own land, stores it in tanks on
her own land, and then conducts it through pipes, all
upon her own land, and delivers it to consumers at the
boundary line between her and their lots with the understanding that water can be procured from such system. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in delivering the opinion of
the court, stated:
'' The Van Dyke system appears to be the
only water supply of the inhabitants of the original town of Miami. The number of water users is
not shown. But it appears that the large consum
ers who use meters numbered, at the time of the
Commission's investigation, 675, "" " 'Property
becomes clothed with a public interest when used
in a manner to make it of public consequence and
affect the community at large' (Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113, 126, 24 L. Ed. 77, 84). The property
here in question was devoted by its owners to
supplying a large community with a prime necessity of life. rrhat Mrs. Van Dyke pumps the water
on her own land, stores it in tanks on her own
land, and thence conducts it through pipes all
upon her own land (the strips reserved in the
streets for conduits being owned by her), and
delivers it to purchasers at the boundary line
between her and their properties; and that lot
purchasers bought with the understanding that
they might purchase water from Mrs. Van Dyke's
water system at rates fixed by her, - are all
facts of no significance; for the character and
extent of the use make it public; and since the
service is a public one, the rates are subject to
regulation.
''Counsel eon tend that the use is not public,
because water is furnished only to particular individuals, in fulfilment of private contracts made
with the purchasers of town-site lots. But there
is nothing in the record to introduce that such is
the fact. Purchasers seem to have bought merely
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with tlw oral understmtdiug that water could be
seeured from ilte Van Dyke system. Affidavits
filed by appel;auis :::;lalt~ Pxpressly that their
water cystern is operatc:d 'for tlto purpmw of supplying the rusidluls alJ(J inhabitants of said
1\liami (o\nl 11ile with w.der, and not for the purpose of supplyiug porsoHs gmwrally, with water.'
'J1110 oi'fc,r thus ito to supp:y all the 'inlmbiiauts'
within ilw gin;u <ll'~'il; a11d that, of course, includeto sull\'l'lHlec~''' tenantto, and others with whom
the Van DYh's Jwd 110 voutraet relations. 'l'he
fad that tl~e tot'1·viee ito limited to a part of the
town of :\I iumi douto not prc\·eut i he \Yatur system
from hei11g a publie uriii(y. ~·)ep Del Jl1ar Water,
Light, & P. Co. 1·. Rsltlc111an, 1G7 Cal. G6G, 140
Pac. 691. ''
The Supreme Comi said that property became
elothed with a publie interest wlwn utoed in a manner to
make~ it of puhlic. eousequenee. Certainly the sale of
electricity to a large part of tho inlmiJitants of Kane
and Garfield Counties eauses the IH'orwrties of the
Garkane Power Compauy to bc~eome clothed with a public
interest. AlHl tho U. N. Supreme Court Raid that the
fact tlwt the servic·e ',ntto limited to a pari of tlw town
did not prevent it from !Jr:c·omiug· a puhlie utility. Even
if the Garkaue PO\rer Company delivers tltit> power to
stockholders ouly, the totoekltO!dcrB are a \'ery large
segment of ihe popula\iclll of 1he two eountie:,;, aud mHler
the terms of the artic·lec of the eorporatiou will be increased so as to iuelude a largc~r BegmenL Doesu't that
elearly imlieate under Uw rulu laid dowu in the above
entitled ea:,;e, that the c·ornpany is eloilwd with a publie
interest"? 'l'he faet that it maketo speeial eon tracts does
uot make• it auy lees a corporaticm dotlwd with a publie
interest. 'l'lte public IK'c·omcs inture:,;ted when any com-
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pany attempts to supply a large segment of a community
with the prime necessity of life, such as electricity,
regardless of its contractual relations with its users.
As a matter of fact, a prominent Utah lawyer, Mr.
],rank Evans, in his work '' 'rhe J_,aw of Agricultural
Cooperative Marketing," states, at page 309:
"It will be observed that under the provisions
of sub. (c) of Section 4 agricultural producers
may organize cooperative associations for distributing electrical energy and for furnishing
telephone service to its members. 'l'hore is, however, a condition attached to this grant of authority, namely, that such associations shall comply with existing laws applicable to other businesses of like kind. Under those terms, such
associations might become amenable to public
utility regulation and subject to the jurisdiction
of public service or utilities commissions and thus
to requirements as to convenience and necessity
and as to schedules and rates of service."

Such a writer as Mr. Evans, who is certainly an outstanding man in the field of cooperative marketing,
must have been impressed with the decisions of the
courts in making the statement above referred to.
In the case of Board of Railroad Commissioners v.
Reed, 58 Pac. (2d) 271, the Montana Supreme Court
had under advisement an action which was brought to
enjoin the defendant Reed from operating motor vehicles
on the state highways for the transportation of property
for hire on a commercial basis, either as a common
carrier or under a private contract, unless or until he
had secured from the commission the necessary author-
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ity to do so. The defendant alleged that he was the
employee of the Miles City Shipping Association, a
voluntary association of business men banded together
for the purpose of hanciling only the shipping of the
goods of the associates m1cler contract. 'fhe court said:
'' ''fhe regulation of motor transportation
for the protedion of the public is a legitimate
and wise exercise of the police power of the state,
and courts generally have not been inelined to
excuse the inerem;ing number who earn their
livelihood by the u:,;e of the public highways for
the transportation of persons awl property for
hire from the respon:,;ibility of eommon carriers
on merely teelmieal groumls, and they are particularly slow to excuse them when the plan of
operatioll bean; evidence of a studied attempt to
reap the rewanlH of <·ommon carrier:,; without
incurring tlw eorrespo1Jding liabilities.' * * *
'' 'Contrary to popular opmwn, mere
schemes to evade law, onee their true character
is established, are impotent for the purpose
intended. Courts sweep them asi<le as so much
rubbish' * * * and 'no form of subterfuge or
evasion will IH·event the eourts from going behind
the form to the substance' * * * This is the
rule in thi:,; state even when those :,;eeking to
evade liability or responsibility form a corporation. Scott 1:. fJrescott, ()£} Mont. G50, 22~~ P. 490."
However, the
junction since
defendant and
contract to be

court held that there :,;lwulcl be no inthe association was not made a party
therefore the eourt could not declare the
sham and subterfuge.

The Commission should go behind the form of the
Garkane Power Company ami view the substance.

There can be hut one conclusion drawn from the form
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of this corporation and that is that it is intended to
perform the services of au eleetrical corporation to all
who wish to procure its services within Garfield and
Kane Counties subject, of course, to the territory served
by the corporation.

THE

GAHKANE COMPANY
SHOWS THAT l'l' IS ORGANIZED
TO SERVE THE PUBLIC

EVIDENCE~

O:B~ 'l'HJj~

In the case of Inland Empire Rural Electrification
Inc. vs. Department of Pnbl,ir: Service of' Washington,
et al, 92 Pac. 2nd 258, at page 2G3, the court said:
''The question of the character of the corporation is one of fact, to be determined by the
evidence uiselosed lJy the recoru. A corporation
whieh is actually eugaged as a public utility
cannot escape regulation by the state merely because its charter or its contraet eharaeterizes it
as a private corporation.''
In this conneetiou it is illuminating to examine the
evidence of some of the witnesses produeed by the applicant before the Public Service Commission. The testimony of Bert Gardner ('l'r. 322), states that the people
of Mt. Carmel applied for membership in the Garkane
Power Company in order to obtain service, and that
twenty-three out of a possible twenty-seven joined. He
further testified, '.L'rauseript 324:
"A. Well,
hand, provides
electric servi('e
pany, provided
necessary funds

this contract, as l remember offthat people have applied for
from the Garkaue Power Comthat they are able to obtain the
from the KE.A. to build the line,
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and that they will take service with the Garkane
Power Company as soon as it is made available
and that they will agree to sign up to take this
service for one year at a rate that was fixed at
$2.70. When most of the contracts were written
up that was the rate they gave us to advise to
put on the contract so that it would show something; and that contract provides that a person
can't obtain service without being made a member
and that if they wish to withdraw they may do so
after one month's notice, hut they must agree to
pay up for service for one year to begin with but
after that any time they wish to withdraw they
can do so, hut they would have to give notice of
30 days'.

"Q.

I understand you pay a fee to

join~

''A. W c paid a fcc of $5.00; a membership
fee.''
Mr. Gardner testified that he was a member of the
directors representing the town of Mt. Carmel (Tr.
323). He further testified:

"Q. Of course it's your desire to have
power that motivates you to join the organization~

"A.

Yes, sir." ( Tr. 325).

And in answer to a question he further testified:
''As soon as a definite check up is made as
to the cost, that will determine the rate, and
the rate so far determined has been determined
on the advice of R.E.A. specialists and the rates
have never hecu set but there is a sort of rate
that has been advised as a starting point to work
from. It will he according to the cost of liquidating, the cost of building and keeping it up, etc.

"Q. Did you pass the petition in order to
secure members in Mount Carmel?
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''A. 'Nell, I canvassed the town a half
dozen times. I canvassed with applications for
memberships - is that what you mean"!

"Q.

Yes.

"A. And I have canvassed with applications
for - well, it would he called a customer survey.

"Q. Did you say yon held any official position in the organization?
''A. I do now, yes. 1 am a member of i he
Roanl of Directors of the Garkaue.
'' Q. What is your under'tStandiug aR to
what yon might do under your Articles of Incorporation as to the people you serve?

''A.
stand.

I don't knO\v whether I quite under-

'' Q. Who are you going to serve under the
Articles of Incorporation - are you going to
serve your members only?

"A. Oh, yes. 'l'here is no one allowed to
take service except people who have taken out
membership in Oarkane Power Company.
'' Q. Is there any rule that you have adopted,
or you may adopt, to refuse people to join this
assoeiation?

"A. Well, the only ease of a refusal would
he in a ease wl1ere people were so far away from
the lines that it woudn't be feasible to connect
them up; otherwise, so far as 1 know, there
would he no reason.

"Q. So far as it affects Mt. Carmel then,
so far as you know then, anyone who desired to
join your association, if he paid the fee of $5.00
could join'?
"A.

Yes, sir.
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'' (2. As you understand it, this is not a
profit-making corporation?
"A. Yes. vV e people are working together
to obtain the service at cost, as otherwise it
would not he possible.

"Q. The Garkane Power Company, as you
understand it, has the right to reject any and all
applications?
"MR. GARDN~-:JR: Well, yes, they have. The
Board of Direetors has to pass on the applications
and if there is auy good and valid reason why a
person should be refm;ed they would have a right
to refuse anybody; hut ordinarily they wouldn't
ndm;e any except out of their reach.
''MR. POR 'l'ljJR: Gar kane Power Company
would not accept them simply because they made
application'?
"MR. PORTER: TlH• Board of Directors
decides who shoultl he allowed membership, and
if there is any good reason why anybody should
11ot he allowed to join they could refuse who they
choose, hut ordinarily they won't."
( 'l'r. :326-327).
At this point it might he well to eall attention to
the fact that !vir. Gardner was slightly in error in his
interpretation of the power of the Board of Directors
because it clearly appears from the Articles of Incorporation that the o11ly grounds upon which refusal could
be made would he if the person, firm, corporation, or
body politic, wishing to become a member (a) did not
pay a membership fee as specified, (b) agree to purchase from the corporation the amount of electrical
energy specified, and (c) did not agree to be bound by

the Artic1es of Incorporation an<l By-Laws of the corporation ('l'r. 40). l11 any event, the membership would
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have the right to vote upon the acceptance of the application ('l'r. 40).
Mr. Ji~ardley testified that he was the engineer for
the Garkane Power Company ('rr. 42!)), and thai where
private property was crossed by the company's lines,
easements had been procurred from the owners, and
where a public highway was traversed the State Road
Commission had granted a right-of-way (Tr. 330); that
where the public domain was to he crossed rights-of-way
had br~en procurred from the Forest Service or other
Governmental agencies involved; that a permit lwd been
granted by the ]'ederal Power Commission, and that
each of the towns had granted a franchise authorizing
construction of the lines ( 'rr. 3:n).
Mr. Eardley further testified that it would reqUire
a membership fee of $5.00 in order to join the eooperative, in order to be supplied with power, and that was
irrespeetive of how large a consumer of power the
member was, (Tr. 335). He further testified that there
are some members that are elassified as commercial consumers, who sign up for $5.00 a month in order to get
serviee, and that the Company was attempting to get
the town to put in street lighting ( 'l'r. 335).
JVfr. Ralph Blaekburn, who, it appears, was the
person who signed the application of the Garkane Power
Company, as President, for a Certifieate, ease No. 2262
(Tr. 33), testified that a test survey was made and it
was f(~lt that 0110ugh persons were interested to make
a projed, and then members were secured and rights of
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way and easements were taken; that they had 65 or 70
members in Orderville out of 85 families (Tr. 338).
While it is true that Mr. Eardley testified that each
consumer only had one vote, Mr. Blackburn testified
(Tr. 339):
"A. Yes, all paid-up members. We have the
paid-up members of the owners of the power
plant. Mr. Carrol has two membership fees. Now,
you stated that you can only have one vote, but
wherever you are in a corporation it is something different from an individual, so Bishop
Carroll owns a home being near the store he
operates. He has to take out two and, of course,
if he is the President of that he would have a
vote for each. He is the President or Secretary
of the Orderville Power Company. He handles
most of their business and he has two memberships that way through his store. Mr. Heaton is
another member of the Power Company - Orderville Power Company - and he also has membership in the Oarkaue for his home and for
his garage, and lw and his brothers have taken
out a membership for the Heaton garage.
Mr. Blackburn further testified that no money was to
be taken out for profit or sinking fund, but only for cost
and maintaining the lines aud paying back the interest.
He further testified that the membership fee was used
for the first cost of obtaining a loan and different expenses before the loan was granted, and that it came
under what was called a construction fund, and was
used sometimes to pay mileage for directors and for
other things that the Government didn't allow to be
paid for from the grant of $177,000 (Tr. 340).
He further testified (Tr. 341):
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'' Q. Can you think of any reason now why
you would reject any member?
''A. Nothing, unless it would be that we
have beeu held to the restriction of 1,000 feet.
'' Q. You know of no reason and, in other
words, you hold yourself out to serve any and
everyone that comes, if they come within the limit
of 1,000 feet and pay their $5.00 you will serve
them?

"A. Of course they would have to live up
to the by-laws and rules and regulations.

"Q. But, there isn't any reason why anyone
should be turned away?
"A. No, sir. In fact, that is the purpose of
it -to give power to those rural districts where
we have not been able to obtain central station
power." (Tr. 241).
He further testified that there were around 600 members
in the Garkane Company and that when it was first
started they had a possible 785 to work on (Tr. 342).
Mr. Merle J. Spencer testified that in Glendale
there were about 50 or 60 families and that there were
about 45 families that were members of the Garkane
Power Company (Tr. 345).
Mr. Harold H. Heaton testified that there were
about 40 families living at Alton and there were about
30 families in that territory who were members of the
Gar kane Power Company ( 'rr. 345).
''A. There is nothing to stop anyone from
coming in. With any of the franchises that we
have, if they can prove to the town or cities that
they are going to furnish the power cheaper,
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there iH nothing to hold the members more than
.10 dayH after the first year.''
He further testified testified that it was the plan of the
Company to serve the 'l'own of J<Jscalante and other
towns in the same vicinity. Mr. Blackburn further testified:
''A. Well, as I understand it, a public utility
is to work in behalf of the interests of the public
in general, and the cooperative or company, or
whatever it might be tltat is serving the public
- to see that the public is dealt fairly with and
that they have a fair priee set on the merchandise,
or whatever it might he - in this ease, electrical energy. 1 think it has been a proved fact
that they have clone a great deal for the State of
Utah - the Public Service Commission has."
(Tr. 3G8).
Mr. Blackburn further testified (Tr. 359):
(""/ JOA~ ~-,:

"MR. frA.RDNER: It isn't only whether
you say you serve the public or not - it is what
you actually do - are you holding yourself out
to serve any and all who ask you for service'?
I haven't had anyone yet give any reason why
they would reject anyone if they had this $G.OO
and lived within a thousand feet of the lines of
the Garkane Power Company. Now, is that what
you are proposing to do - hold yourself out to
Herve the publie "?
''MR. BLACKBURN: Well, we are not
trying to refuse~ but ~we have the right to reject
them.
"MR. GRANGIDR: You couldn't reject
them just heeam;e they had red hair, or something like that?

"1\IR. BLACKBURN:
to fix up some excuse.
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Well, we might have

"MR. GRANGER: Well, there would have
to be some good reason, but I haven't been able
to conceive of any if they live within a thousand
feet of your lines you will take it to them.
"MR. PORTJ1~R: Supposing someone filed
an application and refused to grant us a right of
way over the premises to their home - what
would be the result?
"MR. BLACKBURN:
give him power.
"MR. POR'l'ER:
plication?

Would you reject his ap-

"MR. BLACKBURN:
"MR. POR'l'ER:
tract is it not?

Well, we couldn't

Yes. (Tr. 359).

rrhat's a part of the con-

"MR. BLACKBURN: As far as I know,
there is nothing set up anywhere in the allotment
of money for the projeet to buy rights of ways
and easements and if anyone refuses to give a
right of way or easement or to abide by any of
our rules, as set fourth in the Articles of Incorporation and by-laws, we have a right to reject
them.
''MR. PORrl'FJR: 'l'hat is a part of the contract, is it not, that he has to pay the $5.00 membership and also grant Garkane Power Company
a right of way over his premises to the point of
service"?
''MR. BLACKBURN:

Yes.

"MR. GRANGER: That's a rather farfetched example. I wouhln't apply and pay $5.00
and then refuse to do that." ( Tr. 360).
Mr. Middleton is the Superintendent of the Garkane
Power Company (Tr. 364), and he stated that it was
his duty to go out and get easements and rights of way
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wherever the line crosst'S either the property of the
members or other individuals that own any of the
property ( 'rr. 365).
Mr. Eardley further testified (Tr. 370) that the
rate at first was based on 504 :,;igued members, but that
later 50 or 60 others, iucluding two big commercial consumers, one of whom is Bryce Canyon, had come into
the Company. He also testified that they had prospects
for 2 or 3 large eonsumers of power.
It is apparent from the te::;timon~T of the witnesses
of the applicant and from the Articles of Inct>rporation
and by-laws, that regardless of the view taken by tl1e
court as to the effeet of the revision of the statutes
upon the original language of the Utility Act, the Garkane Power Company iutends to serve the public generally.

Spurr, on Guiding Principles of Public Service
Regulatious, Volume 1, Page 23, has this to say about
the matter:
"'ro :,;urn the matter up briefly, it appears
that the legislative policy has been clearly to
specify all of the utilitie:,; intended to be placed
under the authority of the Commission; that, in
most iustarwes, this has been so well done as to
leave little opportunity for controversy, that all
of the well knowu utilities arc, without question,
under the control of modern Commissions; that
oreasionally questions have arisen as to whether a
particular business is :,;uhjcd to regulation, but
that these question:,; have been relatively few and
comparatively unimportant."
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And agam at Volume 1, page 26:
"Since the state cannot by its mere say so
transform a private business into a public calling,
and theu proeeed to regulate it, the question
whether a business falling within the above classifieatiom; really <'Onstitutes a puhlie calling, is
VPl',Y pertinent.
"It is hard to tell just what the differen<'e
is hetwePn a public all(l private ealling, that it to
say, between public service and privatt~ business.
'l'he sale of eleetrieity to the people is undoubtedly
a public service. 'L'he sale of neWSIJapers would
probably be deemed a privatp business. 'l'he sale
of water to tlw people is everywhere regarded
as a public calling, and the sale of soap as a private enterprise. What is the fundameutal tlistinetion which marks one of these undertakings
as public and the other private"? 'l'wo answen;
suggest themselves immediately. One is that the
operation of electrie all(] water plants requires
the use of the publie highways for whieh franchises must he had, while the sale of newspapers
or soap does not. 'l'he other is that electric and
water companies operate under monopolisti<'
L"onclitions while the others clo not.
"But these are not infallible tests and, therefore, not the real distinguishing marks, be(•ause an
examination of the cases shows that a business
may he public although it does not use the highways, possess loeal franehises, or operate under
monopolistic conditions. If these differmH·es are
immaterial, what else is there about one business
that makes it puhlie and another that eharaeterizes it as flrivate? NO (h~finite answer can be
gi VE'Il. * * * ''
With the evidence as it was before the Commission, can it be said that the Garkaue Power Company,
merely beeause each person taking power must also

become a member, is immune from regulation of the
Commission? vVhat about the consumers of the electrical energy - arc they not to he considered 1 Can
it be said that bccam;c the company causes everyone
who would be a patron of the company to become a
member, exempt it from the ;juri8didion of the Commission, even if in the proce88 of its husine8s it furnishes
electrical energy to other puhlie utilities, to political
subdivisimm, and numerous eustomer8 "? Arcn 't con8umers of other eluetrie eompanie8 to be protected "l
Shouldn't tl1e Commission protect the patrons of the
Gar kane Company "l
I quote this language from the ease of Publ'ic
Utilities Cmwrnission of Utah us. Oar-viloch, 54 Utah
406, 181 Pacific 272:
'' 'l'lte tm;t, where the commi88ion has jurisdid ion over a particular utility, is not whether
the party complaiut of, aH here, iH operating au
automobile or stage line for hire over a route
upon a 8chedule or a a fixed rate of fare for the
8ervice8 n'lHlt~red, but the test is whether he is
in fad opera! ing a public utility over a material
portion or the \\·hole of an e8tabli8hed route
over wltie!J auother luu; UJCrctofore obtained from
the eommis;,;ioJJ a eert ifiC'a t e of convenience and
neeesro;ity io Oj)(~rate a publie utility. * * * If,
therefore, by ;:;oliciting patr01wge, as hereinbefore
illu8tra ted, itc may, nevertheless, be prohibited
from so iuierfering. Such, it 8eem8 to us, is
manifestly tlle purpose of Ute act. If such is not
the emw, regulation will accomplish nothing and
the public iuten't.:;[ will not thereby by subserved.''
In the ease of Acquadcanonk Water Company vs.
Boar-d of Public Utilities Co,mmissioners, 118 Atl. 535,
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we find that the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
a company whose business is confined to selling water
under contract to other companies or municipalities,
which in tum distribute and sell to the public, is a public utility, and therefore under the jurisdiction of the
Board of Public Utilities. The Act of New Jersey giving
jurisdiction to the Board was as follows:
'' rl,he board shall have general supervision
and regulatiou of, jurisdiction and control over,
all public utilities, * * * 'rhe term 'public utility'
is hereby defined to inelude every individual, copartuership, * '' • that now or hereafter may own,
operate, manage or control ,,, * * any * * * water
" * '' system, plant or equipment for public use,
under privileges granted or hereafter to be
granted by the State of New .Jersey or by any
political subdivisioiJ thereof.''
The Court in deciding the ease said:
"Under the provisions of the statute, the
ownership, management, operation, or control of
a water plant, system, or e(1uipmeut must be for
public use, and sueh public usc must be under
privileges granted by the State or a political
subdivision thereof.
''The East .Jersey Water Company unquestiouably owns and controls a water supply system
aud its equipment, jointly with the other water
eompanies; but is the ownership, management, operation, and control for 'public use' within the
meaning of the Act'?
''Such ownership, mainteuance, or control of
a water system under the statute must be for
public use· uuder privileges granted by the State
or its political subdivisions. ·

"1 agree with the Board of Publie Utility
Commissioners that the East Jersey Water Com-
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pan.v owns and controls a water supply system
and its equipment, jointly witl1 other water companies. \Vhen~ 1 differ from them is in thinking that the mnwrship, management, operation,
and control are for public use, within the meaning of the ad. i do not think the answer to this
question depends upou tlw fact that the l1~w..;t
.Jcn..;oy "Water Compmty was incorporated under
the General Corporatiou Ad. lt dopcmls ou
wheUwr, as the situation uow iH, with the various
eomplicatiom; and ramifieations, the l<~ast .Jersey
Watt>r Company is engaged in the business of
SllJlJllying \Vater for tlw muuieipalities with
whieh it haH relatious. 1t does not make any
differenee iu my mind that it sells water at
wholesale. Its coum,dions with tho loeal water
companies arc such that virtually it supplies
!he inhabitants of several, perhaps all, the municipalities by virtue of the rights of Uw local
water eompanioH. At any rate, iu order that the
tho rates for water to the individual citir.ens may
lJC properly rogulaie(l, it is t•sscntial that the plan
Hhould be dealt with as a whole, and it may be
uecessary in form to deal with each company,
for obviously if the rate for water supplied by
the ]~ast Jersey Water Company could not lle
regulated, the l<~ast ,Jprsoy Water Company might
eharge ouc of its customers more and others
loss, and might make up the loss on a low rate
from a loeal company by impoHing a high rate
for tlw wl10l<•salc dt~livery. 'l'his, I think, could
not have heou tho int eut of tho Legislatures.
Tho cases eitml on behalf of the I:<Jast .JerHey
Water Company support my view; tho case is
quite similar iu some of its aspeds to tho <'ase
of the II askensar1r Water Co. vs. Board of Public
Ut,ility Cmnmissioners, 903 N .•J. Law, 293, 112
At!, i"J95, whid1 was ro<'cntly before me.

"As to the I<JaHt .Jersey Water Company haviHg privileges from the state or munieipalitios,
1 think it <~mmgh to say that it has the privilege
of being a eorpora tion from tho state, which is
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enough to authorize, and it has the privilege of
t!oing husiuuss in the various municipalities awl
distributing water therein." See North Shor·e
Fish a.nd Freight Co. vs. North Shore Business
Men's Truck Assn., 260 N.W. f)8; Standard Oil
Cornpany ns. City of TJiru·oln, 207 N.W. 172;
Dairymen's Cooperative Sales vs. Public Set·vice
Commission 174 Atl. 826; Eagle-Pitcher Lead.
Cornpany vs. Henryetta Gas Co., 112 Okla. (i;),
239 Pac. 8DO. Pond Public Utilities, Section 808,
page 1824, Volume :3; Section 44, pagl~ 108, Volume1; Charles ~Volfe Packirtg ComJJany "1'8. Court
of !rtdusfrial Relations, 262 U.R. G22.
While it is true that there are some cases iuvolving
mutual telephone companies. in which the courts have
held that the companies did not cornu under the jurisdiction of a regulatory commission, it is interesting to
note the language used by the Public Utilities Commission of .Michigan in the case of Speaker vs. Larkin

Rural Telephone Company, 27 P.U.R. (N.S.) 18:-i:
'"l'he owners of these telephone lines eont end
that they cousiiiute an exception to the general
rule and that the property of these rural teiephone lines is not subjcet to public usc and regulation. No one of these stockholders or copartners would think, if they owned a railroad im;tl~ad
of a telephoue line, that they migl1t refuse io
carry the property or perhaps pen;ous of
those who desir<~d not to hl~eome members of the
railroad company. Yet this is the attitude taken
in n~lation to telephone liues and faeilitie1-1 iu
that virinity, in violation of the statute regulating
telephmw eompm1ies which expressly provides
that 'all laws so far as applieahle now in force
or that may hereinafter be enaded regulating the
transportation of persons or property by railroad eompanies withiu the statE.~ shall apply with
equal fon~e awl effeet to telephone companies.

(Par. 1, Ad 20G, P.A. 191:3). J1Jvery person must
be presumed io know tlult in enteriug the telephine husim~ss tlwy are ellgagiug uot in a strictly
priYa tu toutnprise, but i11 a public business
charg<~d wi1l1 the public interest, subjeei to public
control and iu wlJicl1 t IJpy eould not arl>itrarily
give or rdm;e to gi,·e snviee in aecordanee with
their own judgmmli, whim, or caprice. The
eontrol over a telepllmH; lim~ and its use is
suhscn·ient to tiw public iutPn~st. 'l'hc respoudent
carrier must, therefore, l10lll itself ready to provide rea:-:owd1iy adequate service io all, members
and uoHml'mb(~rs, without disnimination as to
rates or service, who may l1e so located as to be
within the teiTiiory of 1lw company." See Re
Baker Rlcdric CoojJcratirr~, Inc. 21 P.U.R. (N.S.)
150.
See nauis l's. Pu!Jlir: UtiWies Commission, 247 Pac.
801, 7!) Colo. G42, wlwrein the eourt lm<l miller consideration the jurisdiction of the Commission over one
transportiug freight hy motor vehiele, between Grand
.Junetion aml Paonia. ln that ease, tlw shippers who
wore members of tlic~ association were shippers of 90%
of the freight earried ill thai ten·itory. Davis owned the
equipment and lmd a contxaet with the association binding him to haul for ilwt-le ouly who belouged to it, by
accepted shii>ment frem llOll-memlwrs to members and
vwe versa, 011 the order and payment of either. He
maintained a storage stati01l at Delta and insured the
goods transported, eha1·ged regular rates, which were
paid by ilw iJI(lividual sl1ippers, uot by tho association.
The court in deeiding the ease said:
''Had dl•feJI(laut made all save mw of the
shippers of freight iu Umt territory, or all purehasers of voslage al auy post office therein,
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members of the association, and elaimed that
such limitation converted an otherwise public
into a private c-arrier, ihe contention would be
so absurd as to lw im.;tantly rejected. But the
reasoilR for that re;jedion would lw the identical
reasons which demal!d rejeetion of defendant's
contention, in the instant case: (a) The proportion of the public t'erved is so large as to be the
public; (a) U10 limitation iRa mere device to
hoodwink the law.
Here the Company has aR patrons about 85% of
all families in the territory.

It appears that if another utility wished to buy
from the Garkane Company and sell to the public, it
could do so by: obtaining a membership in the corporation.
In the case of Batesville Telephone Cornpany vs.
Public Seruice Cornrnission, 38 J1'ecleral, 2nd 511, the
Federal Court had under consideration the status with
relation to the public Service Commission of a cooperation associatiou called the Farmers' l\futual 'felephone
Company. '!'he seetion of the statue pertinent was as
follows:
Section 1 of the Utility Aet defines a "public
utility" to be "every corporation, company, individual,
association or individuals, '' * ,. that now or hereafter
may own, operate, manage, or control * * * any plant or
equipment within the State, for the conveyances of
telegraph or telephone messages * * * either directly
or indirectly, to or for the public. (Burns Ann. St. 1926,
Section 12672).
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Aml the Court said:
" (1, 2) 'rhe first question that presents
itself to the court for consideration is whether
o1· not the defendant 'l'<~lephmte Company is a
'public utility' as that term is defined in the
Utility Act. If it is not a public utility, then
the Commission has no jurisdiction over it,
and the order entered on November 23, 1928, is
void and of 110 effect. ~Under the evidence, the
defendant 'l'elephone Company owns and operates a telephone exeha11ge to which is connected
several rural lines. 'l'he exchange is located outside the eorporate limit::; of the town of Versailles,
and all its lines, at the present time, are outside
the <·orporation limits of SU(~h town. But, uwler
the evidence in this case, it is able, willing, and
ready to furnish the citizem; of ~rsailles with
tele]Jhmw service, if ~md when such citizens construet a line or lines and eomwet with its exchange. 'l'he number of its membership is not
limitPd, so far as is disclosed hy the evidence.
It is ready and \villing to serve all, that is, the
general public. Under this situation, it cannot
he seriously contended that the defeudant 'l'elephone Company is not a 'public utility,' as that
term is m;ed in the Utility Act. 1t is compm;ed
of an 'association of individuals' who own, operate, manage, and control a plant aml equipment
within the state for the emtvenience of telephmw
messages directly to and for the public. Furthermore, it has filed with the Commission, and
there is llO'N on file Uwrewith, a sdwdule of ratet:l,
all of which iiHli<'ate that both the Commission
awl the dt~fend<lllt 'l'dephmw Company are agreed
that it is a 'pnhlic ui ility.' The mere fact that
tdeplunw srWI'ice is to !Je furnished to its patrons
at cost, that it is a cooperatire association, and
tlot formed for or opPrated at a profit, is immafPrial. Neither of these eknwnts is necessary to
ma),·p of it a JJUIJlir· utility."
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See Rr Baker Rlectric Cooperative, Inc:., 21 P.U.R.
(N.S.) 150, 51 C .•J., page 40, Section 79; 51 C ..J., page
5, Sections 2 and 4. Ill ~West Virginia the Public Service
Commission had before it the idelltieal question presellted iu this cause, in re Tl arrison Rural Electrification
Association, lnr:., 24 P.U.li. (N.S.) 7. The corporate
reorganizatioll of tlw Harrison question was very similar to the one now before this court. 'l'he Commission,
in deciding the ease, decided that the West Virginia
statute provided thai the Commissiou had jurisdiction
over "all public utilities in this state and shall inel11de
any utility engaged in auy of the following services:
Generation and transmission of electrical euergy by
hydro-electric or other utilities for service to the publie * * * ''
'l'he Commissiou said:

"lit view of our state's Htat ute, we do not
agree with intervener's and avplieant'H contention that beeauHe its members serve tlH•mselves
only the general public has no intereHt ill the
classification of applicant's legal status. We
realize that there are responsil>ie authoritieH that
hold that such cooperatives as the applicant are
not public utilitieH. Our examinatiou ot' them,
however, diseloseH that they are haHed upon conditions in juriHdidions where the }JUhlie polit·y
all(l HtatuteH are dissimilar to ours. OUwr authorities hold sueh cooperatives to be public utilitil•s. Sinee it eamwt he llenied that the legislative poliey Hpeeit'ieally declared in this scale
is to confer regulatory jurisdiction in tltis Commission over municipally or publicly owned or
operated eleetric plants, and associations of all
kinds, as utilities, as well aH over privately owned
eleetric plantH, there seemH to he uo doubt that

publicly owHcd Oi' operated clcetrie plants in
rural cornmlmili<·:•. ;~•·e ijk,:wit-w suhjcet to the jurisdie:i(jlJ or tlJC ( 'm1lm ssion, and Uwt eleetrie
businesse:.; condnl'ied hy Uw pulJiie for the members of th;;t pullii" an· :niJj(~t·i to state regulation
under our st<Jtutes.

"\Ve do aoi IJPli<'YP ! hat iht' applicant's charter pro\·is;ullo.; to !lw ;__:fl'vd i hat it 'shall render
no servivlc \o ol' i'or ·lie pulJii<'' is either determinativt: or
J'c:lmc: \'t• ol' its le~a! stat us. The
statute <l(•:·;nn•,; llH·
att•'s poliey with reference
to stwh nu1 ll·l·:;, ;uHl ,·:•H1ro!s. 'J'his <~harter languag<' se<'lllc: ~o '!l~ :t rnurt: self-~:erving dedarat ioH of IW \l:c:igiJ·r ;wr se, vmdrary to the statute.
A eltnrivr <:x<·mpi ion !'rom any le~al liahiliay,
duty, limitation, or imrmmiiy, othenvise applicable to tlw eorp:,rali<llt, would obviom;ly be void.
''\Ve d<J not hulic:n~ lila[ Ute S1Jeeial relatiouHhip oi' mc·mk•n; of a eouperniive to the eorporate
entity, or to u!le ;utOtlJt·r, l'<lll be used as a ruse
to avoid llie COJISC<Jll<'lll·us wltieh nrc attached to
pul!lil' Sl~n·iel' undc:r t]J(: lnw. ~--lee Pipe Liue
Cai-leH (l';tiied States r. Ohio Oil Co.) (HJ14) 234
U. S. 3+8 X lli nur·is 1'. ]'l'o}Jle ('):' rel. l'u!Jlic
l.rtililics ConunissiuJi, 'l!J Colo. 742, '' '' '' 247 Pac.
801, llw (·ourl Sd~J, \\ilJ1 1·ei·~,reucu 1o a restridiou
of sun· ice to 1Lc mondH·<·c; of an m;:.;oeiatiou, ''L'he
limitation is a rnnc: d;_:\<t·c: to lwodwiuk Uw law.'

'"l'ht> npp:ican( a;.;c;o<·intion waH ('rented and
exists for llo iller i11ll' 11osu ilum (o proeun~ electr·i(·ity for ;:;:d m;;l,t• it avui;a!Jle to itc; members.
'l'hai ·is U1·.· z;~u:; n <~:-:oll for \l·hil'lt memht>rs joiu
it. \'{;lh liCilLll;:, ;;rut\'dural requirements for
all of the puh::c·
tl!e <li'l'a of tlte projeet.

:u

'' 'l'lle ap:li :I nni '::-:

lllOJ!r>y

<·omes throu~h the

H1ll':ti
;.;,t,<-1 n;·ifat iou Administration
from I l1e 1!1 ··u;;:;l nH·• :oil l,'inalll'l) Corporation.
1'lll' 1hm;\ i,~:~~(<r~\';;·:l'liml Ad o{ ~lay 20, 1936,

]'ederai

provides for lonns from l1'edend money8 'for
rural cdt•driJ'lc.tl i<nl a11d ilH' furllishiug of elec:-

tric energy to JH'l'SOllS in rural areas who are not
rccciYing eeniral siatioll f-lerTiru.' (ll. E. A. Act,
Chap. 4i32, 4~) E)tai. Code of Laws of 7 U.S.C.A.,
Chap. 31, Pars. ~)02 am! ~J04 ), and further provides: '* * * no lomJ for Uw (·omdrudion, operation, or elll:1 rgemen~ d :m~v {.\;(•Herating plant shall
be made mtle::.;s ihc· COJISeld cf ihe state authority
having jurisdidiun in t l11· premises 1s first obtained.' Seetiou ~J04.
"Since tlw loan is made from public funds,
'persous ill rural a r;_;a:s, L'o1· ·whose beuefi t it is
made, must ml;<m 'ali' such ptrsous iu each such
area capable alHl desirous or reeel\ing such benebit, situated so us io be pradicnlly :snsceptable
of receiviHg iJw elt;dr1e scTviee. \Ve do noi feel
Congress iHlmHbl pn!J i<' mo11eys to be advanced
for Uw benefit oi' a pcn;on or elnss ouly of the
people of au area awl dcm:ed lo others ·witltiu ihe
area vYilliug aud ub:e to ru('eiYe it. Such funds
were evidently iuteudc•ct for all members of the
puhlie iu il!e 'area io hu served, awl it would be
contrary to tlw lcgislu1in~ i:1Lent [lJat mum1Jership
in this cooperative asi-ioe:ation BllOu!J 1Je exclusive
and self-determin~divc . .\lnnlwrship iu the assoeiatiou has hcell acli\·u]y soiicited auJ no applicatiou lws hePu refu:-wd. Line:,; :tre to l1e eonsirueted
ou and aero:,;s pubiic road:.;. l\lembership iu the
associatim1 am1 the clt•dric servicu to be secured
through ii is of public c·onsequeuee of the area
at large. Siuee Fedtcral J'uiH1s are not to be
advanced for purely privntc rmrposes, it follows from tlu· i'orc~~;u1Ilg· ;•oJlsiderations that the
applicant':,; projt;d rru!si ;;p for \he purpose of
serYing the public gt•ucraHy in the lenitory where
eonstrul'tcd, :llld tl1:<l :t \\-i;; remler a public service. ln otJH·r words, i: wi~~ hL' a utiJity with its
service available to ali tlw local iulwbitants.
"'l'he t;YideJH·e i~. f'l('<:l' t!Jat tire applicant
and the protesiaut an• <H·Lual and adiv0 competitors will1 eaeh otlll'r :n ecrr~1i11 loealities for customen.;, loeati<m, a11d pn'emptin• rights. '11 his is
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the very sit nat ion ~w!Jieh tl1c legislature through
the State Rlwnld rcg·ulate wliell it passed Par. 11.
H is busid<· the poini now tllldt~r diseussion
~w!Jcj hc~r Uw prot<~s1an1 lias any prior rights iu
the territory or superior ability to sen'c the
publi<' tlwreiu, ~wh<•ilwr it has f'orfcit<~d any sm·h
rigll(s hy its coll<luel, or whether tl1e applieaut.
is eniitl<•d to a ei<wr field without eompdition or
to 1lw right to compel<~ with the older utility.
'l'lwsc are the very questions to be eonsid<·n~d ou
tlte merits aml d<derminnd hv the Commission
upon 1he applieation for a <·c~·tificate undL'r tlw
law and the cvid<,w·e. 'L'lw legislature intended
that the Commission shouid decide in such eases
whether tlw puhlie vnMare and benefit would )H~
]H,st served and s<>eured hy the o1w or the other
em1tender. 'L'lw rcasm1 anZl policy of the statute
npp<,ar:-; to lw plain and we hclicv<) mo:-;1 salutary.
1\11 i ndu:-;t ry ('<l nnot he regulated effect.i vely in
part with tlw other part. nnregnbt1t•<l.
'J'he lm1guage of ilw Commission in the Harrison
H ura I J1~lc'l'i ri fie a tion eas<~, that the Federal Govc~rn
ment being the entitly that is lending the funds must
speeify thai tlw full(ls will he u:-;ed only for public purposes, is so logical that it leads to hut one conelusiou,
and that is, if the publie fuuds are usPd for the purpose
of allowing the Ga rkane Power Company to furnish
electrical e1wrgy to m<~mbL•r:-;, then eleetrieal energy must
also be fnrni:-;hed to the J!libli(: a:-; thai term is generally
defined.
'!'he Obio ~uprenw Court in the ease of lndustrial
Gas Co. 1'. Pul;lic Utilities Commiission of Ohio, 21 N. E.
(2nd) 1GG, had under eonsideration a request that the
gas company be permitted to withdraw property from
service to uomPstie users of gas aml woulu not he subject
~ )(j

to jurisdiction of the Commissiou on the ground that
it was no longer a public utility and therefore, not subject to the regulation and control of the Commission.
The company had amended its Articles of Incorporation
to state: "I~'or the purpose of produeiug, acquiring, distributing and selling natural gas for industrial use, only,
and in connection therewith, acquiring, operating and
disposing of leases and other properties incident thereto.'' rehe gas compauy operated a trausmission system
in several towns in Ohio hut owned no gas wells. The
property consisted of pipe liues, measuring stations and
certain buildings. The company operated about 50 miles
of pipe line and served 19 iwlustrial and 12 private
consumers located in five or six different towns, all
under written contracts, which stipulated the price to
be paid for gas. The gas (•ompauy did not hold itself
out to serve the public generally and had refused to
serve certain industrial and private users in its territory. The 12 private

consumer~:-;

had been givn the priv-

ilege of buying as a part of the consideration for right
of way grants across their property. No proceedings of
condemnation had Leen instituted to acquire property
or right of way. 'l'he Court in upholding the Public
Service Commissioll finding Umt the gas company was a
public utility within the statute

~:-;aid

that under the

sections of the Public Utility Aet, a pcrsou, partnership,
association or corporation engaged in the business of
supplying natural gas for lighting, power or heating
purposes to

consumer~:>

within tlJiH State or in the Lusi-

ness of tram;porting natural gas through pipes or tubing,
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either \Yholly or part:n'ly \lllliin 1l1is Stale is denominated a public uli::ty

<LJld

tb·ian:d snhjc:ct to regulation.

We mnst :t~lmii ;.1 t!tu t:ll~~wt tltat Uw Ohio statute
1s mueh more ;iwlll::;\.l' tluH\ u:1r 0\\'11.

llowen:r, the

rcasouiug· of the \ 'oun ,u nn:\ iJ:g at its deeision is so
pertiuent to tlw red~;cl!ing iluli. mn::>i be iudulged in by
the

Couri

lll

1l1i~'

tlui1

cast,

wish

to

take

the

liberty of <lnoti11g fu;,y from the ease.

"it rn«y \\·;•Ji : ' urg'(·d tlml a <'Orporatiou,
w •.·ow
'·' \\·![11 }JUl>lie utilities aud
talw a\\'<tY lnn;:nl :·'-::> 1'nn:1 : iwm, ::;]JOuld be under
like l't,gn,:~iory n·.<rid:on ii' di'cdive goverunwut:u ~;npt:rn~H\dt i:-; to l;c• maintained. Aciual
or lJOtuHLla! <·om;H_:UJi.IJ \\;[it odwr eorporatious
11·hcse Lm.;m(•,;s .:·: hot iit'd v;i ,lJ a vuiJlil~ interest
i::; a fad(Jl' .u ill: < ,;m;i(i:•n•d; olllen,·ise eorpo-

<'<denialun

ratwm; :.·owd i)e

(Jl'!..;'<UUZt·d

to uperaLe like appel-

lant :tJI(l in l'i)lll 1 Jt~ltlt<Jll 1ndJ tJOll<t fide utititiet>
uut1l ihc• \\;!cod' ~' n.e ,-,·m1:d IJe lwHuy-eomlJed
witl1 UlUil «>He 1 nLJ11<~ reg·watJOIJ would beeomc a
siwm <llld de; U::ll\lli.
"\Villil "l'JlU'iallt c;cek::> Lo do ic; to pick out
eerlHtll Uldl!:·;t J'J(l: r~(;it:-lULll:l's ill seied Lerritory

and sen c \l,,·HI undu:· :-;;JU(~iaJ (~<J!llrads to the
exvlu::;;cll o: <~:i :,: ;,,:r~; c•xcl:pt :,;uvh tH'ivaie or
Llome:-;Llc . \'ilhliiLJ.~.·: ::
n~,ty :~nit its eouvenience
awl :ui.\·<ull«~;t. t Lcl'e wen_: otlwr iudusirial consumen; willl \\ lL.i.ll tlic <lJllJe!iaHt 1·efused or failed
to agree~ :~lid so d:,t Lol c;(:rn: lltem. If sueh eonsunll;rs \\en· :" 1·,·l:' ,,, ai,, ic musl. ueeessarily be
IJy a <·:,m 1;dnc;. d. a Lu:-;!;;v::;c; so ean·ied on may
e::s<:<tpe pul ;<. i"e~;u:;:l:c.n :!Jell theru would seem to
l>L: uo va:'d r; <h"·i: 1, ii)" «;!pei:ant may Hot extend
the sen';<.,, io <[o;:;J;c, t.rip:e or many iimes the
numl:l'l' !l(,\\ :'crvud \\'illH;ut heing amenable to
reguiati\·c mcabure;-:.
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"A public utility to 11H~ extent of its capacity
is houm1 to :c;c•rn· those of !lw public~ who need the
service am1 arc witllin tlw field of its operations,
at reasonable ralCH nwl without discrimination.
• • • This duly doeH noL purmit such a public
service corporation to pick ont good portions of
a partic·ular lelTi(ory, setTe only select customers
under private contract, awl refu:se serviee (vvhich
it aloue ea11 gin\) to the rcmai11inp; portions of
territory and io otlJer usen;. Uuited Fuel Co. v.
Rd. Cmnm. of Kent 11dy, 278 U. t--;. i300, 3W, 49
S. Ct. lGO, nl L. ~Jd. :l!JO. Yet if, is not a controlling factor· that tile cor;;!,rafiou sup;;lying service
does not hold itseff out to sen·e the public generally. It ll!zs {;el'11 11dd tlwt a husi11ess may be so
far affected with a Jm:'dir: inlcn;s/ that it is subjPct to n~gulatiou as to rates aud clwrges even
though tltc J!IIMic docs wd 1/(l/'(' the right fo demaud and receire scr,·icc. Oeriilan Alliance Ins.
Co. c. Lcu;is, 2il>l U. t). :38!!, 34- S. Ct. 612, 58 L.
Ed. 1011, L.lLA. IDl 3C, 11 8D. (lLalics mine).
"Hcgardh)SS of tlw right of Ow public to
demand awl rceeive sel'viee in a particular instance, 01e qlwstioii wlJdJwr a husi1wss enterprise
constitutes a pulJiie utility i;; determined by the
nature of its opera( iuus. I<;;; eli case must stand
upon the fade: peculiar to it. A eorvoration that
serves snell a substantial pal'i of Lho public as
to make its rates, dwrgec: and muilwds of operations a maUe1· of pu!Jlit· ('Oueern, welfare and
interest subje<'l s j t self tu n·;~·u!a ti on by the duly
eousti t ut cd gon:nJm(~lllal au! l1ority. Cl arksb~trg
[,ight & lleot Co. r. l'i!lJ/'ic Sarin' Cmnmission,,
84 W. Va. G:l8, 100 ~~- K ~>31. Nor sl10uld the
curtailment of its ill(·ideulai corporate functions
made with ilw purpo;,;e of avoiding public regulatory proee::;s()S he ddl:rmiHative of the true charader of it;,; lmsiuc;,;s. TlJUc:, clmuging the purpose
clause of' ih; charader, refraining from use of the
right of cmiue11t domain, nvoiding a holding out
to serve tl1e puhli(' V,l'llt•raily and selling only to
seleet consumers i>y r>rivule cuJitrad eould be

employ<~d as subterfuges by many public utility
eompauies. If the bm:;innss iH still affecte<l with
a public iuterest, it remains a public utility.

"Tt is the eonclusion of this court that appel. ' ]aut dedicated itself to public utility service in
behalf of a Huhstantial part of the public and
within a substautial area as to make its business
n matter of public c·oneern, welfare and iuten~st;
COllHequently it is a public utility and suhjeet to
rc•gnlation hy the Public Utilities Commission."
'l'lw actual or potential competition with other
eorporations engaged iu the distribution of electrical
energy awl which business is ge11erally clothed with a
public interest, is a fact to be eousidered in cldermining
whether the Public Service Commission should take jurisdiction of the Garkaue Power Company. All electric
companies might organize a cooperative corporation and
make eadt eonHumer or user of the electrical energy a
member and thereby defeat the purpose of public regulatiou.
In the case of Parlett Cooperative, Inc. v. Tidewater
Lines, Inc., 164 l\1d. 40::>, (16;) A, 31:n, the Court had
nuder consideraticm the question as to whether the Parlett Cooperative, l11c. came under the jurisdictiou of the
Public Serviee Commission. 'l'he Compauy was organized to eolleetively produee, prepare for market, handle,
store ami market, alHl particularly to transport milk and
other products of its memherH, alHl of acting as the selling and buying agent or both, and also for any other
purpose permitted. It had a eapital stock of $2,000,
divided into sharPs of $10 eaeh. It operated a truek
over a part of tlw route Herved by the 'ridewater Lines,
100

and tram;ported for hire for its stoekholders milk and
other freight in competition with Tidewater, Inc., eontended that it was a private person and uot a public

na

carrier, that the Public Rerviee Commission hadf jurisdiction.
"11\)r reasons poiutcd out in Rutledge Cooperative Assn. v. Baughman, 153 l\Id. 297, 1:38 A.
29, which need not be repeated here, a ppcllallt 's
business is necessarily impressed with a public
interest. It is a corporation with an identity
distinct from its stockholders, who arc not obliged
to ship over its lines, and whose stock may be held
as any other iuvestment. At its will, its stoek may
he so distributed that it may serve as mnuy
persons as it could if it were a common carrier
operating over the same route. rrhe par value of
its stock is teu dollars. By the mere dcviec of
issuing to eaeh of them a share of stock, it
could secure as patrcllls all persons needing sueh
service as it offers overs the route it serves.
1 ts operation would damage the highways to the
same extent as any other public carrier. If it
sees fit, it eau awl will serve the whole public
willing to buy a share of stoek and in need of
sueh service as it offers, as would any other public
earrier, and its gains will be distributed to its
stockholders as would those of any other public
earrier. It is in aetive, real, and injurious <·omrwtition with other public earriers, and tlw form
of its organization is little more thau a deviee to
use the eorporation laws of the state to permit
it to operate~ in the guise of a private carrier when
il all essential elements its business is that of a
public earric~r. Its ineideuts, its powers, and its
operations are not to be distinguiRhcd from those
of a public earrier, awl in truth and in fact it is
a public carrier.''
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Now we C('illt~ I'·

iill ann:~·si:-:

of <'t~rtain eases which

have het'll l'i~ud hy 1\tc (brk:llle l'm\'(~1' Company <IIHl the

Rural

l1Jj~,f·t

rifieai imJ /ulmini::·; raiiou.

n,] t!1c J\dminit·draiion have
exit~m:in

!y. /, l'al':'L'Il' r; ndim;· of tlwt ease, ho-.,vevcr, \\'ill disdo:;e LiJ<:i (he cil'HteHU·: present in this
case were cntin·ly !:lrL:illp; in l!J N<:lsmt case (State
ex r-cl. P!i{;fic Fiil.'f :r·s Cou1 1:1 ::;siuu of IT taft i'. Nelson,

qnotell

65 Ut. 457,

:.:::~8

P. :2::7)

<l1ttl

fur: ilc·r that tlw Court placed

its d(:('ic;in;t mn:ni,\· u;w11 :lw f:w! iltat ilw mall operating
ihe emTi<tg-c iilles \':n:,:

duilt~',' ''O ;:H <ill

ag·cut of the com-

pany. "1t was in vir~.lH~ of U11: ('Olil raet madt: hy him
with Ute m;~:uci<tLcn, «nd nul cllll~rwisc, lind he <•lJg·agecl
in the bm;iucss <•r empi<;yrrwnt," aud fnrtlwr, that the
trmlRporL\timt \\':tS Jl(,~ ; ht• mnill or principal object of
bm;iness. H w:1s lmt :ill iH('!:klll O!' :-'(~('(Jil<btr)' to mwllwr,
the eornnnmi 1~- ('<tnl., J :t 11d i h-; mnini ewmec. If under such
eirenms1auct:s, 1>e'< lter i !L' m;sue::d ion uor tlw defendant
under his e01I1rat·! with!;, willtont a permit or certificate
from th(' c(;mmis:;inu. 'Oil d l:1 v,·l'u! ;_,. ~;o transport gnesh;
amJ SUJliJiies of t]Je ilc',H!i<'i<!(i;J]l to HJI(] from the eamp,
them eculd Jto1 a mi11:H:.; t(J1ll[1;;ny optT<ding <1 mine up
or rw:tr tl1e (<lll.\'!Jlt ir;JJ';;wrt i1s t~mpioyees aml fn:ight
ami suppl;es 1o nnd frum i s mine, or lt~gally make a
cuniract ,,;:11 Hli(J;iiu·w d,, so, \\'itllont a permit from the
eomm1sswn.

\VP Lel~c'<' :Lni tL· ~' i:;ull t·mw I8 uot contro1ling. 'l'!t( r::.;t;..;·:.w;.:;<· (:I ujl~ Nuprerne Court, I
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admit may he used as a persuasive argument on the
question of public service, hut I am inclined to the belief that if the faets vverc presented that the device was
used merely as a cloak or method to evade the statutes,
the Supreme Court would not hesitate io hold that the
Commission had jurisdiction.
]'or a discussiou of similar decisions to that of the
Utah Supreme Court, see 44 Harvard Law Review, 530.
I think that it will become appareut on a reading of that
article that the decision of the Supreme Court did not
have such a wide effeet as is eonteuded for hy the Rural
Electrification Administration.
There are two eases cited by the Rural Electrification Admiuistratiou which are difficult to differentiate.
One of those cases is State Public Ut,ilities v. Bethany
Mutual Telephone Assn., 110 N.E. 334. \Vhile the Court
did hold that a telephone company limited strictly to
members of the eorporatiou did not come within the
purview of the Public Regulatory Acts, the Court said,
"the purpose of the act is to bring under control by the
public, for the common good, property applied to a
public use in which the public has au interest.'' but
decided that this eompany had not rledieated its property
to a public use. The Court also discussed the case of
Public Utilities v. Noble "~Jutual Telephone Company,
268 Ill. 411, (109 N.E. 298), aud the case of the Buncombe Metallic '_Celeplwuc Co. (Buncombe ilJetallir: Telephone Co. v. McGinnis, 2G8 Ill. 504), (109 N.E. 257).
It is clear that in the Betlmny ease the court deeided
that case solely on the delimitation of the powers of the
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Company, as foull<l in ilH~ ehnrter. H iR tlte ron tent ion
of your defendant that the testimony before tlte CommisRion sltowR that the Garkane Company intends to
serve evPryone in the territory who will beeome a member and abide by its ruleR, awl pay the costs of memhership, if the TJerRon d<>siring to gr~t the servire lives
within the agreed (liRtanee from the line.

A reading of the ease of Public Utilities
Commission rs. Noble, 27G Ill. 121, 1B N.K mo, will
disclose that Uw holding of the Supn~me Court of Tllinois
in that em;e, ~which was decided after the Bethany ease,
is in favor of the contention of your defendant. \Vith
this faet iu mind, 1 would like to eitc the ease of Kitsap
Co. Transportation Co. 'I'S. 1~1anitrm Assn., 176 \Vash.
Rep. 486, the ease of Northslwre vs. Bus'incssmen's Associafion, 1~)(j 1\limt. :3:3G, ami the ease of Borough of Am. C',omm?.ssuJn
. .
{~'"' Atl .
o j' J> a., 1 uu
IJnr. i ge vs. I) u;ll.7C ,S' en·u·e
47. Here the Conrt in deciding the cm;e used this
language:
"'l'he sole question is wltdlwr the Byers Co.
m selling water to tltr~ Spang Co. is operating
as a publie sr'n·i<'e <'ompauy."
'l'he Court :-mstni!l(~d thP Commission m deeirling
that they had no jurisdiction o\·er the Byers Co., hut
a reading of the fads disdose that tlte Byen; Co. ~was
furnishing watt~r but to o1w company, the flpang Co.,
and athough it would nppear that the Byers Co. wa:,;
elearly a private eompany, tlw Court took eonsiderahle
time to diseuss the e:,;st~ntial differenee hetweeu a private
company and a puhlic S(~rvwe eompany. 'l'lte eourt said
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that "the furnishing of water to a single consumer in
no way involves a puhlie iutcrcst; nor can it be said
that by its aet tlmt it has devoted itR water business to
a public * * * regulation." Aml yd iu the language of
the Court, '"rlw Byers Co. is a private mmmfacturiug
corporation; it has no charter rights to supply water to
the public; it has no grant of any rights to occupy streets
or other property with \Vater lines, and therefore has
neither rights nor power to render puhlie service." How
different arc the faet8 i11 tl1e ease before this Commission. Sec in re Fa,nners' ,~1utual Tefeplwne Co., 8 P.U.R.
(N.S.) 260; lnd. Oas Co. i'S. l)u/;/ic Utilities Commission,
21 N.E. 2nd 166.

It is the contention of the Public Se1Tiee Commission that the Garkane Corporation offers to serve, and
will, any of tlw public who will !J(~eome a member of it,
in addition to its original membcn;, nnd for that reason,
is subject to tlw jurisdictiou of the Public Service
Commission. State ex rel. lle!Jn rs. Trego County Cooperative Telephone Crnnpauy, 212 Fae. ~)02, 112 Kans.
701. Gillman vs. 8umnu;rsct Fanners Cooperative Telephone Company, 151 Atl. 440, 12D l'.lc. 243.
We now come to ihe \Vasl1iugton <'Hse lately decided
(Inland Empire Rural l't'lcrlrificatirm Inc. z:s. Department of Public 8e1·uice, !J2 Pae. 2ud. 238). That case at
first blush would appeur to be pursuasive, lmt a careful
examination will show that llte r·ase wa::; not based upon
evidence suel1 a8 \\'Hi:l addue<~d hy tlw Puhlie Service
Commissio11 of Utah, uor was it lJasr'd upou a similar
statute to that of the State of Utah.
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subject to regulation hy the Department of Public Service only when, ancl to the extent that, its hut>ines:,; is
dedicated or devoted to a public use, iR not the ROll~
ha:,;is of determining the jurisdiction of a public service
cormmission. 'l'lw fad that the Compauy may have
franchiseR similar to those given to tlw Garkaue Company should he a factor. The fact that anyone who
wishes to join the corporation may get the service:,; of
the corporation should he a factor. 'rhe fact that approximately 80 or 8G(Y,1 of the public in the area arc members
Rhould be a factor. The fad that the Company will sell
applianeeR, and if propt>r Rafe-guarding of the eonsumers
is not aeeompliRhed hy the Commission, they may he left
without atlequate :,;erviee at a time when they need it
moRt. Unh~sR the CommiRsion sds up adequate rates
and 8inking fund reRerves, tlw plant may not be replaced, and the eoJIRumers may he left with lines and
appliances and no electrical energy to supply them.
Certainly the language of the Court:
"The tt>st to he applied iR whether or not
the corporation holds it8elf out, expressly or
impliedly, to supply it8 8erviec or prouuct for
use, either hy the public as a class or by that
portion of it that can be served by the utility,
or whctht•r, 011 the contrary, it rnerely offers to
serve rmly ]Jarticular indiuiduals of its o1on sele(·tion" (page 2G:-:l), eamwt he, 110r ever wa8, the tm.;t
of whether or not a corporation wa8 8Uhjed to
the juri8diction of a public servi(·e eommisRion,
or wh(•ther or not it wa8 within the definitioll8 of
a statute 8imilar to our8,
and shows that the premi8e upon whieh the decisiou is
based is uot supporteu l1y the authoritic8. Sec City of
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Chicago 1'8. A {ton R.R. Co., B:-i5 Ill. p. 65; Pioneer Telephrme Oo. rs. State et al., 144 Pae. 1060 (Okla.); Valcour
vs. Village, etc., 2 Atl. 2nd 312; Mumn vs. Illinois, 94
U.S. 12fi. Seo Celina 011d Mer('(~r Counties TelephMie Co.
vs. Union Center JJutual Telephone, Association, 133
N.~J. 540, 21 A.L.R. 1145; soe ah;o the note to that case
at 21 A.L.R. page 1Hi2. See Public Utility Regulations
by Mosher and Crawford, pages 6, 469, and 480. Affiliated 8er1'ice .Corp. os. Public Utilitif,s Commission, 186
Jete.
~e
N.K 10:~, 10:1 A.L.R. 264, 51 C.•T. .........,.,, 2J ~ 4.
l"'t":'\~

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above reasons, it is respectfully
submitted that the decision of the Public Service Commission of Utah, subjediug the Garkane Power Company to its jurisdiction and granting to them a Certificate of Convenience and N eeessity is corroct as to law
and to fact and should be sustained by this court.

RPsper:tfully submitted,
.JOSFJPli CIH~Z,
Attorney General.

By .JOHN D. RICE,
Attorney for
Public Service Commission.
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teAppeals
For Control

Of REA Unit
The Utah supreme court i,s
destined to hand down an opinion
of great importance to cooperative
electrification projects in a
case which was heard by the court
Monday,
The case. is an appeal from a decision of the Utah public service
commission that the Garkane Power association, a project financed
by the rural electrification adminIstration, is subject to state supervision.
The question involved has been
passed on only once before by a
'state supreme court, and that was
in the state of Washington. The
case there was brought before the
high court on a declaratory judgment demurrer, instead of on. appeal as in Utah.
R E A Sends Counsel
Because of the significance of
the Utah case the R E A eent its
general counsel, Vincent D. Nicholson, to Salt Lake City to· present arguments before the court.
The public service commission was
represented by John D. Rice, lilS·
sistant attorney general. Mr. Nicholson. was assisted by Warren W.
Porter of Panguitch, attorney for
the Garkane Power association,
which provides service in Garfield
and Kane counties.
Mr. Nicholson argued that the
association is not subject to the
supervision of the public service
commission because it is not a public utility in the ordinary sense.
He declared there is an identity of
interest between supplier and consumer, while a public utility is a
profit corporation "doing business
at arm's length with the consuming public."
State Claims Control
Mr. Rice said it was testified be·
fore the commission that anyone
who wanted to join the association and thus obtain electric service would be accepted. He declared that even though the associa,tion calls itself a cooperative, it
serves a large section of the public
in its territory and therefore is,
in fact, a utility subject to state
supervision.
In the Washington case the court
held in favor of the R E A.

